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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of 
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law 
from the year 2004.  They are neither comprehensive in breadth 
(several cases are omitted) nor in its depth (many issues within 
individual cases are omitted).  Attorneys should not rely on these 
summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to 
alert the Alaska legal community about judicial decisions from the 
previous year.  The summaries are grouped by subject matter and 
presented alphabetically within each grouping. 
 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
In Alaska Center for the Environment v. Rue,1 the supreme 
court found that, although the Fish and Game Commissioner 
misconstrued the definition of a “subspecies” under Alaska law, 
the commissioner’s ruling against extending endangered status to 
the Cook Inlet beluga whale was valid.2  Several environmental 
                                                 
1 95 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2004). 
2 Id. at 927. 
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groups petitioned the Commission under the state Endangered 
Species Act to protect the Cook Inlet beluga, whose population had 
dramatically decreased over the last decade.3  The Commission 
found that new federal regulations would correct and control this 
problem and declined to extend endangered status to the beluga.4  
The supreme court upheld the ruling under a rational basis review.5  
Applying a “substitution of judgment” standard, however, the court 
held that the Commission incorrectly limited the term “subspecies” 
to a narrow taxonomic category.6  Instead, the court determined 
that “subspecies” may be more broadly defined, with consideration 
given to relevant scientific information, and held that this broader 
standard should guide the commission in future evaluations of the 
belugas’ status.7 
In Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. v. Knowles,8 the 
supreme court held that Alaska law requires the appointment of a 
FRANK commission to assess the costs of a proposed 
governmental relocation only after the voters pass such an 
initiative.9  Alaska Statutes section 44.06.060 requires that the 
legislature establish a commission to determine costs associated 
with relocating a “present function of state government.”10  
Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. (AFEG) filed suit in 
response to a ballot initiative that proposed moving the legislature, 
arguing that state law requires the appointment of a FRANK 
Commission to determine the costs of relocation before voters vote 
on a relocation initiative.11  The superior court adopted the 
government’s interpretation of the statute, which called for the 
creation of a commission only after a relocation initiative had 
passed.12  The supreme court affirmed, holding that based on the 
statute’s own language, as well as its context and public policy, the 
correct interpretation calls for the creation of a FRANK 
commission only after a relocation initiative is passed as a ballot 
measure.13 
In Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement 
Funds Held for E.R.,14 the supreme court held that the Consortium 
can enforce a health care provider lien on settlement proceeds 
                                                 
3 Id. at 926. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 928. 
6 Id. at 931. 
7 Id. at 933. 
8 91 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2004). 
9 Id. at 274. 
10 ALASKA STAT. § 44.06.060 (Michie 2004). 
11 91 P.3d at 274–75. 
12 Id. at 275. 
13 Id. at 278. 
14 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).  
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received by Alaska Native patients from third-party tortfeasors.15  
The Consortium entered a health care provider lien for the value of 
services provided to Warden after Warden was injured in an 
automobile accident.16 Allstate, the tortfeasor’s insurer, 
subsequently settled with Warden to cover all losses.17 Warden’s 
attorney informed and sent the Consortium the amount of 
settlement after he deducted his attorney fees from the settlement. 
18 The Consortium refused to endorse the check and filed a 
complaint for the remaining fees.19 The court held that federal law 
allows for the enforcement of the Consortium’s health care 
provider lien because a tribal organization providing health 
services has the right to recover reimbursement from third parties 
for reasonable expenses.20 Additionally, the court held that the 
Consortium’s health care provider lien must be reduced by the pro 
rata share of the patient’s attorney’s fees.21 
In Alaska Trademark Shellfish v. State,22 the supreme court 
held that the Aquatic Farming Act precluded the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game (“Department”) from issuing 
exclusive rights to harvest and sell wild geoduck clam stocks that 
existed on aquatic farms.23  Alaska Trademark Shellfish and other 
shellfish farmers (“applicants”) filed an application with the 
Department for permits to harvest and sell geoduck clams.24  The 
Department ruled that the farmers would only be permitted to use 
the wild geoduck clams for brood stock or active cultivation rather 
than for harvest and sale.25 The Department therefore refused to 
issue the permits unless the applicants could develop a method to 
distinguish farmed from wild geoduck clams and would agree to 
use the proposed method when farming.26  The applicants refused 
to comply, and their applications were denied.27  The superior 
court affirmed the Department’s decision.28   
On appeal, the State argued that the Aquatic Farming Act 
prohibited the Department from issuing exclusive rights to harvest 
and sell wild geoduck stocks that already existed on the applicants’ 
                                                 
15 Id. at 421. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 421–22. 
19 Id. at 422. 
20 Id. at 424. 
21 Id. at 428.  
22 91 P.3d 953 (Alaska 2004). 
23 Id. at 959. 
24 Id. at 954. 
25 Id. at 954–55. 
26 Id. at 954. 
27 Id. at 955. 
28 Id.  
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farm sites.29  The court agreed with the State, noting that the 
operation permit statute30 only allows the Department to grant 
farmers permits to acquire and sell stock that is used or reared for 
the purpose of further growth or propagation, which precludes the 
harvesting of unfarmed, wild stock.31  Similarly, the stock 
acquisition permit statute32 only allows permit-holders to acquire 
aquatic plants or shellfish from wild stock in order to supply stock 
to the Department or to a licensed aquatic hatchery or farm; it does 
not grant a right to harvest wild geoducks for general commercial 
purposes.33  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the Department’s 
denial of the applications for aquatic farming permits.34  
In Anderson v. Alaska Bar Association, 35 the supreme court 
held that while the superior court lacks jurisdiction to review 
appeals from the Alaska Bar Association regarding attorney 
misconduct, the Alaska Supreme Court may review these 
matters.36  Anderson alleged cases of attorney misconduct and filed 
a grievance with the Alaska Bar Association, but the Bar Counsel 
denied his request for an investigation.37  Anderson appealed the 
administrative agency’s decision to the superior court; the case was 
dismissed, and he appealed to the supreme court.38  The supreme 
court held that it has the authority to hear appeals regarding 
grievance-closing decisions made by the Alaska Bar Association 
pursuant to Bar Rule 22(a).39  The appropriate standard of review 
is whether the Bar Counsel abused its discretion in denying the 
request for an investigation.40  
 In Boyd v. Artic Slope Native Association,41 the supreme 
court held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred in 
ignoring testimony from a claimant’s treating psychiatrist42 but 
was within its discretion to implicitly deny the claimant’s motion 
to exclude certain evidence.43  After the Board denied her workers’ 
compensation claim, Boyd challenged the decision, alleging that 
the Board failed to make adequate findings and violated her due 
                                                 
29 Id. at 958. 
30 ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.100 (Michie 2004). 
31 91 P.3d at 958. 
32 ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.120. 
33 91 P.3d at 958. 
34 Id. at 960. 
35 91 P.3d 271 (Alaska 2004). 
36 Id. at 272. 
37 Id. at 271. 
38 Id. at 272. 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 No. S-10793, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 77 (Alaska 2004). 
42 Id. at *12. 
43 Id. at *20. 
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process rights.44  The supreme court held that, although the 
Board’s findings do not have to be exhaustive, the Board must 
make some findings for every material contested issue.45  Hence, 
the Board erred in failing to consider disputed testimony from 
Boyd’s treating psychiatrist,46 and in failing to explain what 
inferences it drew from an investigator’s report about the work 
incident that allegedly caused Boyd’s illness.47   
The court also found that the Board’s failure to rule 
explicitly on Boyd’s motion to exclude expert witnesses was not an 
abuse of discretion because the Board implicitly denied the motion 
by relying on those witnesses’ testimony in reaching its decision.48  
The court concluded that the Board did not violate Boyd’s due 
process rights because it held a hearing on the motions to exclude, 
it was not bound by any formal rules of civil procedure, and Boyd 
had adequate access to the testimony via discovery.49  
In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Dena’ Nena’ 
Henash,50 the supreme court held that at least some of Dena’ Nena’ 
Henash’s properties were eligible for charitable-purpose tax 
exemptions and that most of the exemption applications should 
have been granted by the borough.51   Dena’ Nena’ Henash, a 
regional Native nonprofit corporation that provides services 
throughout the interior of Alaska, applied to the borough for 
charitable-purposes tax exemptions on several parcels of its real 
property.52  The borough denied the application after finding that 
the corporation was funded largely through government money.53  
The corporation appealed the assessor’s decision.54  The supreme 
court used a two-part inquiry to determine tax-exempt status:  (1) 
whether there is a nonprofit, charitable purpose and (2) whether the 
property is being exclusively used for an exempt purpose.55   The 
supreme court concluded that a property does not necessarily lose 
tax-exempt status by deriving a profit56 or because of government 
financial support.57  The court refused to limit its analysis to the 
factors advanced by the borough, preferring to consider any 
                                                 
44 Id. at *8. 
45 Id. at *9–10. 
46 Id. at *12. 
47 Id. at *13. 
48 Id. at *21. 
49 Id. at *21–23. 
50 88 P.3d 124 (Alaska 2004). 
51 Id. at 126. 
52 Id. at 127. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 130. 
56 Id. at 133. 
57 Id. at 134–35. 
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relevant circumstances in the charitable-purpose analysis.58  The 
supreme court held that some, but not all, of Dena’ Nena’ 
Henash’s properties were eligible for charitable-purpose 
exemption.59 
In Libertarian Party of Alaska, Inc. v. State,60 the supreme 
court upheld a soft money regulation promulgated by the Alaska 
Public Offices Commission.61  The Campaign Disclosure Act 
specifically restricts “hard money” 62 contributions and more 
generally limits campaign expenditures for the purpose of 
influencing an election.63  The Alaska Libertarian Party challenged 
the regulation, which required that political parties disclose “soft 
money” contributions and expenditures.64  Finding that soft money 
can be used to avoid hard money limitations, the supreme court 
ruled that the disclosure requirement fulfilled the Act’s public 
information purposes.65  The regulation was consistent with Alaska 
law and therefore was a legitimate exercise of the Commission’s 
authority.66  The supreme court affirmed the superior court in 
denying an injunction and sustaining the regulation.67 
In Mechanical Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State,68 the 
supreme court held that the Department of Public Safety and the 
Department of Community and Economic Development had the 
authority to adopt the International Mechanical Code (IMC) 
because it conformed to the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA).69  Plaintiff argued that adoption of the IMC 
violated statutory authority70 and was inconsistent with the 
Uniform Mechanical Code.71  The court held that the agencies had 
statutory authority to adopt a code different from the Uniform 
Mechanical Code because the legislature did not intend to confine 
                                                 
58 Id. at 135. 
59 Id. at 126, 143. 
60 101 P.3d 616 (Alaska 2004). 
61 Id. at 617. 
62   “‘Soft money’ and ‘hard money’ are exclusive categories.  ‘Hard  
money’ refers to donations made for the purpose of influencing the  
nomination or election of a candidate.  ‘Soft money’ is most easily  
defined negatively as donations to political parties that are not ‘hard  
money,’ thus not made directly for the purpose of influencing the  
nomination or election of a candidate.”  
Id. at 617–18. 
63 Id. at 618. 
64 Id. at 620. 
65 Id. at 626–27. 
66 Id. at 622. 
67 Id.  
68 91 P.3d 240 (Alaska 2004). 
69 Id. at 242.  
70 Id. at 244–45. 
71 Id. at 251. 
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them to the Uniform Mechanical Code.72 Moreover, the court held 
that adoption of the IMC did not violate the APA because it was a 
reasonable decision, and a fiscal note was not required.73   
In Nason v. State,74 the court of appeals upheld a statute75 
requiring the Department of Public Safety to collect DNA samples 
from individuals convicted of felony “crimes against a person.”76  
Nason argued the State violated his privacy under the Alaska State 
Constitution and Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution by requiring submission of a DNA sample and 
criminalizing refusal.77 Nason also argued that the statute violated 
the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution because 
only individuals convicted of “crimes against a person” were 
required to submit.78  The court presumed that the statute was 
constitutional in the absence of contrary authority; it did not 
address the merits of the Fourth Amendment argument.79  
However, the court held that the equal protection argument failed 
because there was a valid reason to require a sample from 
individuals convicted of felonies against a person.80  The court 
chose to limit its holding because of the difficult constitutional 
issues presented by the case.81 
In Simpson v. State,82 the supreme court affirmed the 
decisions of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
(“CFEC”) to limit the number of permits in a non-distressed area 
and to deny Simpson skipper status in 1984.83  CFEC decided to 
limit the number of permits to seventy-three for the Northern 
Southeast Inside sablefish fishery.84  The CFEC then set up a point 
system to determine order of priority for permit applicants based 
on past participation and economic dependence.85  Simpson 
applied for a permit and claimed sixty-five points.86  CFEC 
awarded him fifty points, concluding he did not qualify as a 
skipper in 1984.87  The superior court affirmed.88  The supreme 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 251–52. 
74  102 P.3d 962 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
75 ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.034 (Michie 2004). 
76  Id.; see also 102 P.2d at 963. 
77  102 P.2d at 963. 
78  Id.  
79  Id. at 964. 
80  Id. at 965. 
81  Id. at 966. 
82 101 P.3d 605 (Alaska 2004). 
83 Id. at 607. 
84 Id. at 607–08.  
85 Id. at 608. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 609. 
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court held that CFEC has the authority to limit permits in non-
distressed fisheries as long as it sets “the maximum number at a 
level that is no lower than the highest number of units of gear 
fished in any one year of the four years prior to the limitation.”89  
The court also held that the CFEC did not err in denying Simpson 
skipper status in 1984.90  Under clear statutory language, Simpson 
did not qualify as a skipper because he lacked the requisite 
license.91   
In State v. Greenpeace, Inc.,92 the supreme court upheld the 
application of a public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine.93  Greenpeace appealed a ruling of the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issuing a water use 
permit to an oil company.94  The appeal triggered an automatic stay 
on the permit, which was lifted upon a motion by the oil company 
on one day’s notice.95  Greenpeace appealed to the superior court, 
arguing that the lifting of the stay was clear error, and the 
extremely short notice amounted to a denial of due process.96  The 
company subsequently notified DNR that it no longer needed the 
permit.97  Although the water use permit was no longer in dispute, 
the superior court continued the action under the doctrine of the 
public interest exception to mootness, ultimately holding that 
lifting the stay was arbitrary and clear error.98  On appeal, the 
supreme court held that, although the permit’s expiration rendered 
the controversy technically moot, the superior court rightly 
considered the due process claim under the public interest 
exception because a similar dispute could arise again and might 
never be heard if the mootness doctrine were rigidly applied, and 
also because the issue was vitally important to the public.99  The 
supreme court further held that review of the merits of the decision 
to lift the stay did not fall under the public interest exception 
because DNR amended the regulation granting an automatic stay 
and future similar disputes would not arise.100  The supreme court 
held that the public interest exception should not allow a “proxy” 
decision on the water use permit and vacated the award of 
attorney’s fees to Greenpeace.101 
                                                 
89 Id. at 611. 
90 Id. at 614. 
91 Id. at 614–15. 
92  96 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2004). 
93 Id. at 1068–69. 
94 Id. at 1059. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1059–60. 
98 Id. at 1061. 
99 Id. at 1062–63. 
100 Id. at 1068–69. 
101 Id. 
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 In State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe,102 the supreme court held 
that the Alaska Joint Boards of Fisheries and Game did not act 
arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating a regulation103 that 
identified nonsubsistence areas.104   The superior court held that 
the regulation was inconsistent with Alaska state law.105  The 
supreme court disagreed and upheld the disputed regulation as 
originally adopted, finding that the Boards did not exceed their 
discretion because they gave careful consideration to the proper 
criteria in their evaluation of the starting boundaries for the 
nonsubsistence areas.106 
In State v. Municipality of Anchorage,107 the supreme court 
held that an electricity subsidiary of the Municipality of Anchorage 
was exempt from a state tax on gas for the gas it produced for city 
use.108  The state argued that the tax should apply because 
municipalities were not expressly listed as statutory exceptions.109  
The supreme court held that state law exempted municipalities 
from tax absent an express provision to the contrary.110  The court 
found no legislative intent to apply the gas production tax to 
municipalities; therefore, the gas used by the subsidiary to produce 
electricity for Anchorage was exempt from taxation.111 
III. BUSINESS LAW 
In Disotell v. Stiltner,112 the supreme court held that the 
Alaska Uniform Partnership Act113 does not require liquidation of 
partnership assets upon dissolution, even upon request by a 
lawfully dissolving partner.114  Disotell and Stiltner formed a 
partnership to construct and operate a hotel but were unable to 
agree on the details of their plan, leading Disotell to seek 
dissolution of the partnership.115  Disotell argued that he could 
demand liquidation under the Partnership Act because he did not 
wrongfully cause the dissolution.116  The supreme court held that 
                                                 
102 83 P.3d 1060 (Alaska 2004). 
103 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.015 (1992). 
104 83 P.3d at 1062. 
105 Id. at 1071–72. 
106 Id. 
107  104 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2004). 
108  Id. at 121. 
109  Id. at 121–22. 
110  Id. at 121. 
111  Id. at 123. 
112 100 P.3d 890 (Alaska 2004).  
113 ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.330 (Michie 2004). 
114 100 P.3d at 894.    
115 Id. at 892.  
116 Id. at 893. 
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liquidation was discretionary and that the lower court did not err in 
permitting Stiltner to acquire Disotell’s partnership interest.117 
In Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,118 the supreme court 
held that a pro se litigant cannot represent a class in an unfair trade 
practices and antitrust action.119  Claiming that the airline breached 
a series of contracts by failing to honor various terms of his airline 
tickets, Hallam sued the airline.120  He also contended, on behalf of 
a class of passengers, that the airline’s standard ticket terms and 
policies contravened Alaska’s Fair Trade Practices Act121 and state 
antitrust law.122  The superior court dismissed all of Hallam’s 
claims, and he appealed.123  The supreme court affirmed these 
holdings because Hallam’s appeal challenged findings of fact that 
were not clearly erroneous;124 the supreme court also affirmed the 
dismissal of Hallam’s unfair trade practices and antitrust claims 
because the plain language of the Federal Airline Deregulation Act 
preempted such claims.125   
In Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,126 the supreme 
court affirmed the re-imposition of litigation-ending sanctions 
against Hikita and Alaska Foods, Inc. (collectively Alaska Foods) 
for failing to produce pretrial discovery.127  Prior to the present 
appeal, the court had already remanded once for the trial court’s 
consideration of possible and meaningful alternatives to its 
sanctions against Alaska Foods.128  On remand, the superior court 
did, in fact, consider lesser sanctions but renewed its dismissal 
based on a finding that additional monetary sanctions or a 
contempt citation would not cure compliance with discovery 
requirements.129  The supreme court affirmed, holding that the 
superior court did not abuse its discretion by relying on Alaska 
Foods’ actions after the initial grant of sanctions in 1990.130 
In Industrial Commercial Electric, Inc. v. McLees,131 the 
supreme court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment for McLees.132  McLees, a former Industrial Commercial 
                                                 
117 Id. at 894. 
118 91 P.3d 279 (Alaska 2004). 
119 Id. at 287. 
120 Id. at 281. 
121 ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (Michie 2004). 
122 91 P.3d at 281. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 281. 
125 Id. at 287–88. 
126 85 P.3d 458 (Alaska 2004). 
127 Id. at 459. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 462–63. 
131 101 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2004). 
132 Id. at 594. 
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Electric employee, and his wife took several corporation 
documents,133 and to recover them, the president of Industrial 
Commercial Electric entered into a settlement and release 
agreement with them.134  Both the corporation and the president 
filed a suit against the McLees, and the McLees filed 
counterclaims.135   The lower court granted summary judgment for 
the McLees, finding that the corporation’s claims were barred by 
the settlement agreement and mutual releases.136  However, the 
supreme court held that the settlement agreement and mutual 
releases would not bar a claim if they are invalid.137  The court 
concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether the president was induced to sign the agreement by a 
fraudulent misrepresentation, and whether his reliance was 
justified.138  The court declined to hold that a releasing party is 
never justified in relying on factual representations of a released 
party during settlement of claims which accused the released party 
of fraud or dishonesty.139  The supreme court reversed the grant of 
summary judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.140 
In Matanuska Electric Association v. Chugach Electric 
Association,141 the supreme court held that Chugach did not breach 
its contractual obligation to act in accordance with “prudent utility 
practice” when it failed to comply with terms outlining the 
procedures for submitting proposed rate changes to a state 
regulatory agency.142 Matanuska claimed that Chugach had 
violated its obligations under a purchase-and-sale agreement to act 
according to “prudent utility practice” and to submit proposed rate 
changes to a joint committee of company executives before 
submitting them to the Regulatory Commission of Alaska.143 The 
supreme court reversed the superior court's grant of summary 
judgment for Chugach on the “prudent utility practice” claim, 
holding that the lower court erred in finding that the contract 
imposed no such duty.144  However, the supreme court affirmed 
summary judgment for defendants with respect to the proposed 
rate changes, holding that under the terms of the contract the 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 595. 
135 Id. at 596. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 597. 
138 Id. at 599. 
139 Id. at 601. 
140 Id. at 602. 
141 99 P.3d 553 (Alaska 2004). 
142 Id. at 565.  
143 Id. at 556–57. 
144 Id. at 562. 
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disputed rate changes were exempt from the joint committee 
process.145 
In Matanuska Electric Association, Inc.  v. Waterman,146 
the supreme court held that the business judgment rule does not 
apply to situations where the plain language of a corporation’s 
bylaws contradicts an action by its board of directors.147  Janecek 
was elected to a seat on the board of directors of Matanuska 
Electric Association (MEA),148 but after discovering his failure to 
disclose some campaign contributions, the board voted not to seat 
Janecek.149  Waterman, an MEA board member, successfully sued 
to compel the board to seat Janecek.150  The supreme court rejected 
MEA’s argument that the business judgment rule protected the 
board’s decision not to seat Janecek151 because the plain language 
of MEA’s bylaws allows any candidate in violation of campaign 
disclosure rules to cure such violations within thirty days.152  
Because Janecek complied with the bylaws and cured his 
violations, the board did not have the business discretion to unseat 
him.153 
 In Runyon v. Association of Village Council Presidents,154 
the supreme court held that the Association of Village Council 
Presidents (AVCP), a non-profit corporation consisting of fifty-six 
Alaska Native villages, was not entitled to the protection of the 
villages’ tribal sovereign immunity and could be sued by private 
parties.155  Parents of students who were injured while attending a 
Head Start program operated by AVCP sued the corporation for 
negligence in failing to adequately train the Head Start teachers.156  
AVCP filed motions to dismiss, asserting immunity from suit 
based on the tribal sovereign immunity of its incorporating 
villages.157  The superior court granted the motions to dismiss, and 
the parents appealed to the supreme court.158  The issue on appeal 
was whether the incorporating villages were the real parties in 
interest to the suit such that their sovereign immunity could extend 
to the corporation.159  The court held that the villages were not the 
                                                 
145 Id. at 565. 
146 87 P.3d 820 (Alaska 2004). 
147 Id. at 824. 
148 Id. at 820.  
149 Id. at 821. 
150 Id. at 822. 
151 Id. at 824. 
152 Id. at 823. 
153 Id. at 824.  
154 84 P.3d 437 (Alaska 2004). 
155 Id. at 441. 
156 Id. at 438. 
157 Id. at 439. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 439–40. 
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real parties in interest because a judgment against AVCP would 
not reach any village assets.160  The villages’ use of the corporate 
form to shield their assets from liability precluded the extension of 
sovereign immunity to AVCP, and therefore the suit against AVCP 
was remanded to the superior court and allowed to proceed.161 
In Sourdough Development Services, Inc. v. Riley,162 the 
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s approval of a settlement 
agreement that required Sourdough to pay the receivership 
expenses accrued prior to either an acquisition or dissolution of the 
company.163  The court refused to review the trial court’s Alaska 
Civil Rule 79 award of litigation costs to the shareholders under an 
abuse of discretion standard, and instead found that contractual 
interpretation of the settlement agreement was the appropriate 
review of whether receivership expenses should be paid by the 
company or the shareholders.164  The court held that the agreement 
expressly provided for payment of receivership costs by the 
company.165  Therefore, the court required the company to pay 
such costs and declined to tax them as Rule 79 litigation costs.166 
 In Western Star Trucks v. Big Iron Equipment Service, 
Inc.,167 the supreme court held that the Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act168 applies to both cases involving 
consumer goods and services as well as commercial transactions 
involving personal property or services used by businesses.169  Big 
Iron, a parts and service dealer, relied to its detriment on an oral 
agreement that it entered into with Western Star, a manufacturer of 
commercial trucks, to establish a dealership.170  Western Star 
subsequently rejected Big Iron’s dealership application, and Big 
Iron filed suit against Western Star claiming breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, intentional or negligent misrepresentation, 
and unfair trade practices.171  Western Star Trucks argued that the 
scope of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act 
was limited to consumer goods or services and thus did not apply 
to business transactions involving personal property or services 
used by businesses.172  Based on the plain language and legislative 
history of the statute, the court found that non-real estate 
                                                 
160 Id. at 441. 
161 Id.  
162 85 P.3d 463 (Alaska 2004). 
163 Id. at 464. 
164 Id. at 466. 
165 Id. at 467–68. 
166 Id. at 468 
167 101 P.3d 1047 (Alaska 2004). 
168 ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(14) (Michie 2004). 
169 101 P.3d at 1048. 
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 1048–49. 
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commercial transactions are covered under the Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act.173 
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW 
 
In Alaska Community Colleges’ Federation of Teachers v. 
University of Alaska,174 the supreme court held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under 
Alaska Civil Rule 82.175  The university prevailed on an appeal 
reversing an arbitrator’s award to the teachers’ union.176  The 
union argued that the award was unfair because it was obligated to 
defend the arbitration award that led to the awarding of fees.177   
The court held that the union was not a public interest litigant, and 
thus was not covered by the public policy exception to Rule 82.178  
The court affirmed the fee award as within the trial court’s 
discretion.179 
In Alderman v. Iditarod Properties, Inc.,180 the supreme 
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment awarding unpaid rent and 
prejudgment interest to Iditarod Properties, but reversed that 
party’s award of enhanced attorney’s fees.181  Iditarod, owner of 
the Fourth Avenue Theater in Anchorage, rented space in that 
building to the Aldermans.182  In 1997, the Aldermans moved their 
business next door and operated under the name “Fourth Avenue 
Theater Trolley Tours,” prompting Iditarod to sue for trademark 
infringement.183  In 2001, the supreme court held that Alderman 
infringed Iditarod’s trademark and upheld an award of enhanced 
attorney’s fees to Iditarod.184  The court also vacated the judgment 
for unpaid rent because the Aldermans had suffered substantial 
prejudice due to Iditarod’s unduly delayed pleading of breach of 
contract claim.185  Iditarod subsequently filed a new complaint 
against the Aldermans seeking damages for breach of the rental 
agreement.186  The supreme court held that the claim for unpaid 
rent was not barred by res judicata because it was a separate and 
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distinct claim from the trademark infringement action.187  The 
court also held that the action was not barred by the statute of 
limitations, which had not tolled.188  Finally, the court found that 
enhanced fees were not warranted because the court should not 
consider settlement negotiations in awarding enhanced fees.189 
In Kozevnikoff v. Tanana Village Council,190 the supreme 
court held that notations made by a clerk on an order of the court 
do not constitute judicial orders.191  After prevailing on a motion to 
dismiss, the Council requested attorney’s fees 192 under Alaska 
Civil Rule 82.193  The court entered a final judgment awarding 
attorney’s fees, but left the amounts blank, and on the certificate of 
distribution a clerk wrote “w/ out cost or atty fees.” 194  
Kozevnikoff argued that the clerical notation constituted a denial 
of fees.195  The court held that the clerical notations were not 
judicial orders, and that orders may be issued prior to making final 
calculations of awards of attorney’s fees and costs.196  
In Lakosh v. Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation,197 the supreme court affirmed the propriety of the 
superior court’s judgment and denial of motions.198  Lakosh filed 
an original suit contesting the validity of select regulations issued 
by the Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”), but 
subsequent events transpired that validated the regulation by 
statutory amendment.199  As Lakosh’s pending claim involved the 
superceded statute, and did not address the validity of the statutory 
amendment, Lakosh filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint 
to contest the amendment.200  Additionally, prior to the 
amendment’s passage but after the original regulation was held to 
be invalid, Lakosh filed motions to compel discovery, for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and for a status 
conference.201  Lakosh also sought sanctions for the DEC, and 
restitution for the DEC’s lack of compliance.202 The court 
reviewed the denials of the motion to amend and the motion to 
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compel discovery under an abuse of discretion standard and found 
that no such abuse existed.203  The court further held that the 
superior court did not err by failing to award relief or restitution to 
Lakosh.204  In so holding, the court noted that there was no merit in 
Lakosh’s claims for restitution from unjust enrichment or in the 
claim for an equitable remedy.205  Finally, the court also found no 
merit in Lakosh’s final appellate claim that the superior court erred 
in “presenting its sua sponte motion … for entry of final 
judgment”; rather, the court held that the superior court was not 
acting sua sponte, but on instructions from the supreme court in 
entering final judgment.206 
In Maloney v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co.,207 the 
supreme court held that an insurance company obliged to make a 
policy limits settlement offer has no duty to include the attorney’s 
fees allowed under Alaska Civil Rule 82 as part of that offer when 
the claimant is not represented by counsel.208  A Progressive policy 
holder struck Maloney’s car, seriously injuring Maloney.209  
Progressive’s settlement offer did not include Rule 82 attorney’s 
fees, because Maloney was unrepresented by counsel at the time of 
the settlement, and the terms of the settlement offer did not require 
the payment of attorney’s fees for unrepresented parties.210  
Maloney argued that the settlement should account for the future 
retention of counsel.211  The court rejected Maloney’s policy 
arguments based on the language of the settlement agreement.212 
In Miller v. Safeway, Inc.,213 the supreme court held that all 
of Miller’s claims failed summary judgment, but that the trial 
court’s failure to allow Miller leave to amend constituted error.214  
Miller, an Alaska Native, was terminated from his job at a Safeway 
store because his long hair violated Safeway company policy.215  
Miller originally claimed that the termination was unlawful 
because it violated his right to privacy and constituted 
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, and race.216  The 
supreme court held that none of his claims survived summary 
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judgment, and affirmed the trial court in this respect.217  However, 
the court held that the failure to reach a decision on the merits of 
the claims in Miller’s amended complaint resulted in significant 
hardship to Miller, and that litigating those claims would not 
prejudice Safeway.218  The court therefore reversed and remanded 
the trial court’s decision denying Miller’s motion to amend his 
complaint.219 
In Simeon v. State,220 the court of appeals held that a 
lawyer’s decision not to request a jury instruction on a lesser 
included offense was a reasonable tactical decision.221  Simeon 
appealed his conviction for sexual assault in the first degree and 
argued that his conviction should be overturned because his lawyer 
failed to request jury instructions of lesser included offenses of 
sexual assault.222  Simeon’s lawyer admitted that it was a mistake 
not to request instructions to the jury on lesser included 
offenses.223  However, the court held that a lawyer has the ultimate 
authority to make tactical trial decisions including whether to 
request lesser included offenses.224  In general, the court held that 
to successfully challenge a tactical decision made by an attorney, 
the defendant must demonstrate that the tactic was one that no 
competent attorney would use.225 
 In Thomann v. Fouse,226 the supreme court held that 
Fouse’s settlement offer was too indefinite to qualify as an offer of 
judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 68.227  Thomann sued Fouse for 
injuries resulting from an automobile accident.228  Before trial, 
Fouse offered to settle for $25,000 plus medical costs to be 
determined through arbitration.229  Thomann declined the offer and 
was subsequently awarded $29,018.88 at trial, including medical 
costs.230  The lower court awarded Fouse with post-offer costs and 
attorney’s fees under Rule 68 because Thomann’s damage award 
was less than Fouse’s offer.231  The supreme court reversed and 
held that Fouse’s offer was indefinite and did not constitute an 
                                                 
217 Id. at 285. 
218 Id. at 295. 
219 Id. at 296. 
220 90 P.3d 181 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
221 Id. at 184.  
222 Id.  
223 Id. at 183. 
224 Id. at 184. 
225 Id. at 185. 
226 93 P.3d 1048 (Alaska 2004). 
227 Id. at 1049. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 1050. 
 18
unconditional commitment to satisfy Thomann’s medical bills.232  
Therefore, the offer did not meet the requirements of Rule 68 and 
Fouse was not entitled to costs and attorney’s fees.233   
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
In Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles,234 the supreme 
court held that the definition of “appropriations” in article II of the 
Alaska Constitution extends only to monetary transfers.235  The 
governor had vetoed a bill transferring state land to the University 
of Alaska.236  In attempting to override the veto, the legislature had 
the two-thirds majority required to enact a bill over the governor’s 
objection if the bill was not an “appropriation” under article II, but 
not the three-quarters majority required if it was an “appropriation” 
under that article.237  Here, a two-thirds majority was sufficient to 
override the governor’s veto because the transfer at issue was not 
an appropriation.238  In reaching its conclusion, the court adopted 
different definitions of “appropriation” as that word is used in 
article II and in article XI of the Alaska Constitution.  Although it 
found the idea of consistent definitions “appealing,”239 the court 
reasoned that article XI was designed to prevent “give-away 
programs and maintain legislative control over the allocation of 
state assets,” whereas article II was designed to “govern the 
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of 
Alaska's government.”240  Because the articles serve different 
purposes, the court concluded that different definitions were 
appropriate.241  The court also rejected the notion that dedicating 
income derived from the land constituted an “appropriation” 
because the amount of income derived from the land was not 
sufficiently certain.242 
In Crawford v. State,243 the court of appeals held that, 
under certain circumstances, statements that a criminal defendant 
made after receiving his Miranda warnings must be suppressed.244  
Crawford admitted under police questioning that he had marijuana 
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and cocaine in his car, was subsequently advised of his Miranda 
rights, and then once again admitted to the drug possession under 
police interrogation.245  The trial court suppressed Crawford’s 
statements made prior to the Miranda warnings, but admitted the 
post-Miranda statements.246  On appeal, Crawford argued that the 
post-Miranda statements should have been similarly suppressed.247  
The court chose not to reach the state constitutional issue of 
whether to adopt the older Brown v. Illinois248 “dissipation of 
taint” test versus the modern Oregon v. Elstad249 analysis for post-
Miranda statements, and held that under either federal test 
Crawford’s post-Miranda statements would be suppressed.250   
In Doe v. State,251 the supreme court held that the Alaska 
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA)252 violated the due 
process right of an individual whose conviction was set aside 
before ASORA became effective.253  In 1987 Doe was convicted 
of child sexual abuse, but his conviction was set aside in April 
1994.254  ASORA became effective in August 1994.255  The 
Department of Public Safety (DPS) created a regulation applying 
ASORA to all defendants, regardless of whether a conviction was 
set aside.256  Doe argued that ASORA should not be applicable in 
his case because it is unconstitutional and DPS does not have the 
authority to create such regulations.257  Since ASORA did not 
become applicable to set-aside convictions until after Doe’s 
conviction had been set aside, the court held that imposing 
ASORA’s registration requirement on Doe violated due process 
because the government could not state a compelling interest to 
justify this requirement.258   
In Doe v. Tandeske,259 the Ninth Circuit uphrlf Alaska’s 
Sex Offender Registration Act260 against procedural and 
substantive due process challenges.261  Doe argued that Alaska’s 
registration law violated procedural due process because it 
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infringed upon a liberty interest with notice or a hearing.262  The 
court held these procedural safeguards had already been provided 
at the trial that resulted in Doe’s conviction.263  The court also 
rejected Doe’s substantive due process claim, because convicted 
sex offenders do not have a constitutional liberty interest in 
freedom from registration and the Alaska  statute was reasonably 
related to the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety.264  
Thus, summary judgment for the state was affirmed.265 
In Dunn v. Municipality of Anchorage,266 the court of 
appeals affirmed Dunn’s sentence for driving under the 
influence.267  Dunn challenged the validity of the sentencing statute 
on equal protection and due process grounds; he argued that the 
State did not have a reasonable basis for expanding a ten-year 
“look-back” limitation to a new provision requiring courts to 
examine all previous DUI convictions.268  The court held that 
because he advanced different arguments on appeal, Dunn had 
failed to preserve his constitutional claims.269  Assuming, 
arguendo, that Dunn had preserved his claims for appeal, the court 
held that he failed to show that the statute lacked a reasonable basis 
and that his equal protection claim was without merit.270  Having 
rejected all constitutional claims, the court affirmed the 
sentence.271 
In Evans v. McTaggart,272 the supreme court held that a 
third-party must meet a clear and convincing evidence standard 
when applying for custody and visitation rights.273  Evans had two 
children, both fathered by different men.274  The McTaggarts had 
successfully filed in the trial court for custody of their biologically 
related grandchild and visitation rights with Evan’s other child.275  
On appeal, Evans claimed that the trial court violated her 
constitutional rights as a parent by granting custody to the 
McTaggarts based on a preponderance of the evidence. 276  The 
supreme court held that in custody cases between parents and non-
parents, the correct standard of review is the clear and convincing 
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evidence standard.277 Evans also challenged the McTaggerts’ 
visitation rights to her other son, who was not biologically related 
to them.278  The court held that Alaska Statutes section 
25.20.060(a),279 which “permits a court to provide for visitation 
based on the best interests of the child,” is constitutional if 
narrowly interpreted. 280  To protect parental rights, the court held 
that clear and convincing evidence should be used to determine 
whether a third-party can obtain visitation rights over the parent’s 
consent.281  
In Larson v. Cooper,282 the supreme court held that neither 
the free exercise clause of the Alaska Constitution nor the free 
exercise clause of the United States Constitution protects an 
inmate’s right to contact visitation with his wife.283  It also held 
that restrictions on contact visitation did not violate the  right to 
rehabilitation nor any liberty interest in contact visits while 
incarcerated.284  Larson, a maximum security prisoner at the Spring 
Creek Correctional Center, sued the Director of the Division of 
Institutions at the Department of Corrections and a correctional 
officer claiming that his religion required kissing his wife and 
holding her hand, and that the Department’s refusal to permit this 
contact violated his right to exercise his religion.285  The court 
held, because the rules governing prison visitation had an 
incidental effect on the exercise of religion and were reasonably 
related to a legitimate state interest, they were permissible under 
the U.S. Constitution.286  Applying its reasoning from Frank v. 
State,287 the court also concluded that the regulations did not 
violate the Alaska Constitution’s free exercise clause.288 
In Miller v. Safeway, Inc.,289 the supreme court held that all 
of Miller’s claims failed summary judgment, but that the trial 
court’s failure to allow Miller leave to amend constituted error.290  
Miller, an Alaska Native, was terminated from his job at a Safeway 
store because his long hair violated Safeway company policy.291  
Miller originally claimed that the termination was unlawful 
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because it violated his right to privacy and constituted 
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, and race.292  The 
supreme court held that none of his claims survived summary 
judgment, and affirmed the trial court in this respect.293  However, 
the court held that the failure to reach a decision on the merits of 
the claims in Miller’s amended complaint resulted in significant 
hardship to Miller, and that litigating those claims would not 
prejudice Safeway.294  The court therefore reversed and remanded 
the trial court’s decision denying Miller’s motion to amend his 
complaint.295 
In Ruckle v. Anchorage School District,296 the supreme 
court held that the mother of a student lacked citizen-taxpayer 
standing with respect to claims against the school district over its 
grant of school transportation contracts.297 However, the supreme 
court also held that a litigant must be allowed to amend pleadings 
when the litigant demonstrates valid reasons for dong so and the 
allegations do not appear futile. 298 The Anchorage School District 
(ASD) granted a five-year student transportation contract to First 
Student in lieu of renewing with the current provider, Laidlaw 
Transit.299  Laidlaw’s superior court challenge against ASD was 
converted into an administrative appeal.300 Then, Ruckle, a parent 
of ASD school children, also sought relief.301  Citing the absence 
of Ruckle’s citizen-taxpayer standing, the superior court granted 
ASD’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
refused to grant Ruckle leave to amend her complaint.302  The 
supreme court agreed that Ruckle did not have standing because 
under the appropriateness test,303 a more directly affected plaintiff, 
Laidlaw, had already brought suit.304  However, the court held that 
while Ruckle was not necessarily entitled to file an amended 
complaint without seeking leave of the court,305 the superior court 
erred in later refusing to grant leave to amend. Leave must be 
freely given when such leave is neither motivated by bad faith nor 
would result in a futile amendment.306 
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In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,307 the 
supreme court upheld the constitutionality of an Alaska statute308 
and an Anchorage Municipal Code ordinance309 requiring 
landlords to rent to unmarried couples despite the landlords’ 
personal religious objections to such a practice.310 Thomas and 
Baker sought a declaratory judgment enjoining enforcement of the 
statute and code, arguing that the threat of sanctions and 
compulsion of rental, regardless of marital status, violated their 
rights of free exercise of religion and free speech.311 Although the 
court found that the plaintiffs had standing and that the issue was 
ripe,312 the court nonetheless held that the plaintiffs failed to meet 
the standards justifying a departure from stare decisis.313 
Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts that 
the ordinance was the least restrictive means available.314 
In Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage,315 the supreme 
court upheld the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance.316  
In an effort to curb juvenile crime, Anchorage enacted an 
ordinance that prohibited a minor unaccompanied by a parent or 
guardian from visiting a public place during specified curfew hours 
unless engaged in certain exempt activities.317  Minors cited under 
the ordinance challenged its constitutionality on the grounds that it 
was void for vagueness and violated their right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.318  Their parents also 
challenged the ordinance as impermissibly infringing on their 
substantive due process right to raise their children.319   
The supreme court held that the ordinance was not void for 
vagueness because ordinary people could understand the terms of 
the ordinance with sufficient clarity,320 and it did not allow for 
undue discretion in enforcement.321  In response to the minors’ 
equal protection claims, the court decided to apply strict scrutiny to 
the ordinance because it affected the fundamental rights to 
intrastate travel, privacy, and speech.322  The court held that the 
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ordinance survived strict scrutiny because it was the least 
restrictive available means to achieve the municipality’s 
compelling interest in protecting minors and curbing juvenile 
crime.323  The supreme court also held that, among available 
alternatives, the ordinance was the least restrictive infringement on 
parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of their children.324   
In Varilek v. City of Houston,325 the supreme court held that 
the Matanuska-Susitna Borough’s administrative appeal process 
violates the procedural due process rights of indigent litigants.326   
Varilek claimed that the borough’s ordinances were 
unconstitutional, but this claim was dismissed as unripe because he 
had not exhausted his administrative remedies.327  The borough’s 
administrative appeal process required a flat fee with no waiver 
provision.328  The supreme court concluded that a fee without 
possibility of waiver amounted to a denial of access to the legal 
system.329  The court did not address Varilek’s constitutional 
claims,330  and remanded his case to superior court to determine 
whether Varilek met the criteria for an indigence-based claim.331 
 
VI. CONTRACT LAW 
 
In Imperial Manufacturing Ice Cold Coolers v. Shannon,332 
the supreme court held that the Little Miller Act did not grant a 
subcontractor a private right of action to sue a school district when 
the school district failed to ensure that the bonding requirements of 
the act were met.333  Lower Kuskokwim School District contracted 
with Shannon for the construction of two buildings, though 
Shannon did not provide bonds under the Act.334  Shannon 
purchased supplies from Imperial and subsequently failed to 
pay.335  Imperial sued the school under the Little Miller Act, 
arguing the school owed Imperial a duty to ensure that Shannon 
complied with the bond requirements.336  The court held that under 
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the Little Miller Act government entities are not liable to third 
parties with whom the government has no contractual 
relationship.337 
In Jackson v. American Equity Ins. Co.,338 the supreme 
court held that a trial court may decline to give the jury a special 
verdict form, where the form would allow a finding of insurer’s 
breach of duty in a guarantee of payment of a judgment, were that 
amount to exceed the insured’s policy limits.339 Likewise, the court 
held that it was not plain error for the court to instruct the jury as to 
the duties owed to an insured by the insurer, and that the insured 
had failed to preserve its claim of misinstruction.340 The Jacksons’ 
alleged bad faith on the part of  American Equity in its role as 
insurer of the mechanic who installed a trailer hitch that later 
malfunctioned, causing serious bodily injury to the Jacksons.341 
The trial jury found for the insurer, and the Jacksons appealed, 
claiming error on numerous counts, including: an improper special 
verdict form, an improper admission of expert testimony, and 
misinstruction of the jury.342 The court held that the proposed 
special verdict form was not supported by legal authority.343 The 
court further held that the instructions given to the jury did not 
constitute plain error because the failure to object to the 
instructions at trial was part of the Jacksons’ legal strategy.344  
Finally, the court held that expert testimony was admissible, even 
when it was not in the expert report, because the report provided 
sufficient disclosure prior to trial and because similar evidence 
offered by another witness was admitted without objection.345 
In Peterson v. Ek,346 the supreme court, applying 
Washington state law as required by a contract’s choice-of-law 
provision, found that Peterson breached a contract to renovate and 
sell a boat.347  Peterson and Ek had agreed that Ek would purchase 
a boat and that Peterson would then renovate the boat for resale.348  
Peterson failed to complete the renovations on schedule, used Ek’s 
cell phone and credit card without her authority, and then refused 
to turn over control of the vessel upon written demand.349  Peterson 
argued that the trial court had failed to compensate him for the full 
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value of his labor and had improperly awarded Ek certain costs and 
expenses.350  The supreme court found that the contractual 
damages were foreseeable and that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to compensate Peterson for the value of his labor or 
materials.351 
In Still v. Cunningham,352 the supreme court held that a 
woman who prevailed on a civil rights claim against a bank’s 
requirement that she sign a guaranty was entitled to the full 
recovery of attorney’s fees.353  In support of Vern’s business, 
Premier Homes, Vern and Wanda Still signed identical guaranties 
to Northrim Bank, which Vern later revoked.354  Premier defaulted 
on a loan, and the loan’s assignee sued Vern and Wanda as 
guarantors to collect the outstanding balance.355  Vern and Wanda 
claimed the revocation precluded liability for the loan and that 
their right to be free from discrimination based on marital status 
was violated because Northrim required Wanda to sign a guaranty 
despite Vern’s creditworthiness.356  The superior court dismissed 
Vern’s claim, but held that Wanda’s guaranty was void, and 
awarded her partial attorney’s fees.357  On appeal, the supreme 
court upheld the finding that Vern’s guarantee applied to the loan 
in question,358 and Vern had failed to preserve any defense of 
mistake or misrepresentation for appeal.359  However, the supreme 
court found that the trial court erred in failing to award Wanda 
reasonable actual attorney’s fees.360 
 
VII. CRIMINAL LAW 
 
In Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,361 the court of 
appeals held that convictions under the Borough’s leash law and 
anti-molestation ordinance require a showing of at least 
negligence,362 and that minor offenses are governed by the same 
speedy trial requirements as other offenses.363  Alvarez was held 
strictly liable for failure to properly restrain an animal and 
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allowing an animal to run loose and bite a person.364  The court of 
appeals reversed the convictions, finding the ordinances’ use of the 
terms “permit” and “allow” imply some volition on the part of the 
actor and that conviction requires a showing of at least 
negligence.365  Alvarez also alleged that her statutory right to a 
speedy trial was violated because the Borough failed bring her to 
trial within 120 days after her request for a jury trial,366 as required 
by Alaska Criminal Rule 45(c)(6).367  The court ruled that Rule 
45(c)(2) applied to minor offenses, and therefore the time for trial 
did not begin to run until Alvarez was served with the Borough’s 
second complaint.368  Because trial commenced within 120 days of 
the date of service, the court rejected Alvarez’s speedy trial 
claim.369   
In Cogdill v. State,370 the court of appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s conviction of Cogdill for bootlegging in a 
community that had restricted the sale and/or possession of 
alcohol.371  Codgill had been caught selling alcohol in a police 
sting and was convicted based on that evidence.372  Cogdill 
appealed the case on the grounds that the state had refused to grant 
immunity to a potential witness who had asserted her privilege 
against self-incrimination.373  In affirming the conviction, the court 
of appeals held that the witness’s testimony was not essential to a 
fair trial, and the state had a good reason not to grant immunity to 
the witness.374   
In Howard v. State,375 the court of appeals held that 
Howard was properly convicted of second degree forgery but was 
improperly convicted of resisting arrest.376  Howard was arrested 
after he provided a false name and fled from an officer during a 
traffic stop for speeding.377  For the forgery claim, the trial court’s 
jury instructions required the prosecution to prove that Howard 
intended to defraud another individual, Russell, by signing 
Russell’s name on a traffic citation.378  The appellate court found 
that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury to 
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conclude that Howard intended to defraud Russell because Howard 
knew of the consequences that Russell would face as a result of his 
signature appearing on the citation.379  Therefore, the conviction 
for forgery was affirmed.380 
 The appellate court reversed Howard’s conviction for 
resisting arrest because it found that he did not use “force” in 
resisting arrest, as required by statute. 381  The court interpreted the 
relevant statute as requiring physical contact between the arresting 
officer and the defendant beyond mere noncompliance with 
arrest.382  Because the arresting officer only grabbed Howard’s 
jacket as Howard fled, this was not sufficient contact under the 
resisting arrest statute.383  Furthermore, the statute does not apply 
to situations where the defendant is merely trying to evade arrest or 
hide from the officer.384 
In Jackson v. State,385 the court of appeals held that the 
requirement for joint operation of conduct and culpable mental 
state is satisfied when the defendant’s mental state triggers the 
prohibited conduct, even if the two do not occur simultaneously.386  
Jackson mistakenly missed two scheduled court dates, and was 
convicted on two counts of failure to appear in court.387  Jackson 
argued that the joint operation requirement necessitated a finding 
that his failure to appear was accompanied by a mens rea of 
knowledge about the failure.388  The court of appeals upheld his 
convictions, concluding that Jackson’s criminal act was 
attributable to his previous culpable mental state.389 
In Knutsen v. State,390 the court of appeals held that 
Knutsen was liable for eight counts of indecent photography when 
he hid a video camera in a women’s locker room.391  Knutsen was 
convicted of two misdemeanor counts of indecent photography of 
adult women and six felony counts of indecent photography of 
young girls.392  Knutsen appealed, arguing that he did not have a 
culpable mental state with regard to videotaping children, but only 
with regard to videotaping adults.393  The court of appeals rejected 
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this argument, holding that the fact that he did not intend to 
videotape minors when he set up the camera was no defense when 
his act of setting up the camera led to the taping of young girls.394  
The court also rejected Knutsen’s double jeopardy argument and 
concluded that Knutsen could be liable for eight criminal counts 
even though he had only set up the video camera once. 395 
In McGee v. State,396 the court of appeals upheld the 
defendant’s conviction rejected the claim of self-defense because 
there was no evidence that he faced imminent injury.397  McGee 
was convicted of third-degree criminal mischief for breaking the 
windows of a truck belonging to Alexander.398  McGee claimed 
that he did so to prevent Alexander from running him over with the 
truck.399  The court of appeals found no evidence in the record to 
suggest the threat of harm was imminent, and therefore, the claim 
of self-defense failed.400  In addition, based on its assessment of 
the trial record, the court of appeals upheld the sentencing judge’s 
rejection of mitigating factors and imposition of an enhanced 
sentence for committing an offense while on felony probation.401 
In Ridlington v. State,402 the court of appeals held that 
double jeopardy did not bar the state from prosecuting a defendant 
for felony Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) even though the 
defendant has already plead guilty to a misdemeanor DWI charge 
stemming from the same conduct.403  Ridlington was initially 
charged with a misdemeanor DWI and later charged with a felony 
DWI when police discovered that he had two prior DWI 
convictions.404  Ridlington pled guilty to the misdemeanor, but the 
superior court dismissed the misdemeanor charge and indicted him 
for felony DWI.405  The court of appeals held that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the state from prosecuting 
greater pending offenses when the defendant has pled guilty to 
lesser included offenses, especially when only one trial was 
contemplated by the state.406  
In Robart v. State,407 the court of appeals affirmed Robart’s 
conviction for using the state seal for commercial purposes without 
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permission.408  Robart argued on appeal that federal copyright law 
preempted the state seal protection statute and, alternatively, that 
the jury instructions provided by the trial court had not adequately 
explained his defense.409  The court of appeals found that federal 
copyright law did not preempt the state statute because state seals 
were more similar to trademarks than they were to the types of 
works covered by copyright law.410  The court of appeals also 
found that the jury instructions adequately explained a “mistake of 
fact” defense.411  Thus, the court of appeals upheld Robart’s 
conviction under the state seal protection statute.412    
 In Robbins v. State,413 the court of appeals affirmed a 
probation condition that required the defendant to pay 40% of his 
net income for the support of his family.414  Robbins plead guilty 
to one count of attempted first-degree abuse of a minor for 
sexually abusing his eleven-year old daughter.415  Subsequent 
sentencing resulted in an eight year term with three years 
suspended and probation conditions including a requirement that 
Robbins send up to 40% of his net income to support his family.416  
In rejecting Robbins’s argument that said probation condition was 
not reasonably related to the protection of the public or his 
rehabilitation, the court explained that a judge may consider a 
defendant’s financial support of his family as part of the 
defendant’s rehabilitation.417  Thus, the court held that the trial 
court’s conclusion that Robbins’s rehabilitation would benefit by 
imposing such financial conditions was reasonable.418 
In State v. Yi,419 the court of appeals held that an 
unreasonable belief in the legality of a transaction would not 
suffice to establish the defense of entrapment.420  Yi illegally 
traded alcohol for a bear gall bladder to an undercover state 
trooper.421  At trial, Yi raised the defense of entrapment and 
claimed that the trooper suggested structuring the deal as a trade 
rather than a sale.422  The court of appeals rejected the defense, 
noting that both the sale of alcohol and the sale of bear gall 
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bladders are illegal and merely restructuring the two transactions 
as one would not make the trade legal.423  Therefore, Yi’s reliance 
on the officer’s suggestion was unreasonable and insufficient to 
establish entrapment.424 
In Timothy v. Alaska,425 the court of appeals held that the 
legal definition of “burglary” does not include a motor vehicle not 
“adapted for overnight accommodation,” and thus an Illinois 
burglary conviction that included all motor vehicles was too broad 
to be used for sentence enhancement.426  Timothy was convicted of 
assault and his sentence was enhanced based on three prior 
convictions in Illinois.427  Timothy argued that the Alaska 
definition of burglary is narrower than the definition of burglary in 
Illinois and that presumptive sentencing must be based on prior 
convictions which are similar under both Alaska law and the law 
of the convicting state.428  The court found that Timothy’s prior 
convictions did not qualify for presumptive sentencing because 
only vehicles adapted for overnight accommodation fit the 
definition of “building.”429  The court vacated the sentence and 
remanded the case.430   
 In Wells v. State,431 the court of appeals held the statutory 
definition of “medical treatment” received by a child for injuries 
sustained was unclear and therefore reversed the petitioner’s third 
degree assault conviction.432  Wells was caring for his girlfriend’s 
nine-month-old child when the child sustained several bruises to 
the head.433  Over Wells’s objections, the child was taken to the 
hospital where several tests were performed to check for internal 
injuries but the child was deemed stable enough no to be 
admitted.434  In order to commit third degree assault a person 
eighteen years of age or older must recklessly cause physical injury 
to a child under ten which requires medical treatment.435  Wells 
claimed that since the child’s injuries healed on their own the care 
received by the child did not constitute medical treatment.436   The 
court held that the statutory definition of medical treatment was 
unclear, and therefore, the statute must be construed against the 
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government.437  Accordingly, the court found that the child’s 
medical care did not constitute medical treatment and reversed 
Wells’s conviction for third degree assault.438 
 
VIII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE 
 
 In Adams v. State,439 the court of appeals held that a police 
officer’s pat-down search was not warranted when there was no 
imminent public danger or likelihood that serious harm to persons 
or property had recently occurred, and that evidence obtained 
during that search was inadmissible.440  During an investigative 
stop, a police officer conducted a pat-down search of Adams, a 
passenger in a car, and found cocaine in Adams’s possession.441  
The trial court held that the officer was entitled to conduct the pat-
down search and denied Adams’s motion to suppress the 
evidence.442  Following the Coleman v. State443 standard, the court 
held that the officer was not authorized to conduct a pat-down 
search because he did not have information that would lead a 
reasonable officer to believe that there was imminent public danger 
or the recent occurrence of serious harm to persons or property.444 
 In Albers v. State,445 the court of appeals held that a police 
officer was justified in ordering a suspect to open his hand during a 
drug-related investigative stop because the officer reasonably 
believed that the suspect was holding an object that could be used 
as a weapon.446  Albers sought to exclude drug evidence that the 
officer found in his clenched hand, arguing that the officer had no 
reason to believe that he was armed.447  The court held that the 
officer’s search was reasonable in light of the fact that persons 
suspected of a felony drug offense are likely to carry small 
weapons and engage in violence when confronted by police.448   
In Anderson v. State,449 the court of appeals affirmed a 
conviction for misconduct involving a controlled substance despite 
an illegal search due to the fact that the contraband discovery was 
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inevitable.450  Anderson was arrested on an outstanding warrant 
with a pre-set bail.451  When he arrived at the police station, an 
officer conducted a pre-incarceration inventory of Anderson’s 
pockets without first asking if he could post bail.452  The search 
revealed trace amounts of methamphetamine.453  The court of 
appeals held that this search was impermissible because the State 
could not demonstrate any exigency that would necessitate 
conducting the search before providing Anderson with an 
opportunity to raise bail.454  Nonetheless, the court affirmed 
Anderson’s conviction because the methamphetamine would have 
been discovered through predictable investigative processes.455 
In Brodigan v. State,456 the court of appeals held that the 
district court could impose a mandatory minimum sentence based 
on the defendant’s prior convictions when the defendant failed to 
provide evidence that these convictions were based on an 
unconstitutionally vague regulation.457  Brodigan was convicted of 
misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and faced an 
enhanced sentence of 360 days imprisonment because of six prior 
DWIs.458  Brodigan argued that the court should presume that his 
prior convictions were invalid because a clause in the regulation 
under which he was convicted was later held to be 
unconstitutionally vague.459   The court of appeals disagreed, 
holding that a defendant carries the burden of producing some 
evidence of a constitutional flaw in a prior conviction460 Here 
Brodigan did not produce any evidence to show that his 
convictions were among the small number of DWI convictions 
struck down for vagueness under the regulation.461  The district 
court, therefore, properly relied on Brodigan’s prior convictions in 
imposing a mandatory minimum sentence.462 
In City of Kodiak v. Samaniego,463 the supreme court held 
that exigent circumstances must be present for police to detain a 
witness to a crime464 and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions to 
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refuse proposed jury instructions465 and to exclude certain 
evidence.466  Kodiak Police Sergeant Marsh detained Julia 
Samaniego and her daughter, Marsha, as potential witnesses.467  
The superior court denied Kodiak’s motion for summary judgment, 
refused to give Kodiak’s jury instructions, and excluded two items 
of Kodiak’s evidence, expert testimony and a pocket knife.468  A 
jury found that Marsh falsely confined and committed battery 
against Marsha.469  Kodiak appealed the superior court’s denial of 
summary judgment, claiming that Marsh reasonably believed 
exigent circumstances justified stopping Martha, and in the 
alternative, that exigent circumstances should not be required for 
an officer to detain witnesses at the scene of a traffic stop.470  
Kodiak also appealed the superior court’s refusal to give requested 
jury instructions, exclusion of the knife and the expert, and 
adjustment of Martha’s award of attorney’s fees.471  The supreme 
court held that exigent circumstances are necessary to justify 
detention of a witness to a crime.472  The court upheld rulings of 
the superior court.473 
In Cleveland v. State,474 the court of appeals rejected 
Cleveland’s argument that the trial court improperly excluded 
evidence tending to show that the crimes of second-degree sexual 
assault and second-degree assault were committed by someone 
else.475  The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it refused to admit hearsay and certain 
physical evidence offered by the defendant because such 
exclusions were not based on a determination that the evidence 
was offered for an improper purpose, but rather were soundly 
excluded based on the Alaska Rules of Evidence.476  Further, no 
exception to the hearsay rules was available based on Cleveland’s 
defense that another may have committed the crime because the 
evidence sought to be admitted was that of a mere motive or 
character and failed to directly connect another party with the 
actual commission of the crime.477  The court also upheld 
sentencing for a term greater than the normal ten year ceiling based 
on Cleveland’s two prior felony convictions, his conviction history 
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for criminal assaults, and because substantial aggravating factors 
existed to support a greater sentence.478  
In Crawford v. Drvenkar,479 the supreme court held that 
police officers conducted a legal search of plaintiff Crawford’s car 
and were immune from common law claims.480  A police officer 
pulled Crawford over for a traffic violation and asked for his driver 
registration.481  When Crawford retrieved the registration from his 
glove compartment, the officer believed he spotted a metallic 
object resembling a handgun.482  A search revealed that the metal 
object was a vice grips, not a handgun.483  Crawford sued the 
officers for monetary damages and argued that his right to be free 
of unreasonable searches under the state and federal constitutions 
had been violated.484  In light of Crawford’s admission that the pat-
down search was reasonable, the court held that the search was not 
unreasonable.485  The court also held that qualified immunity 
protects the police officers from § 1983 claims because it was 
reasonable to believe that this search was lawful.486  
In Crawford v. State,487 the court of appeals upheld the 
search of a vehicle’s console during a traffic stop when the police 
officer conducting the stop reasonably believed the console 
contained a concealed weapon.488  Crawford was stopped by a 
police officer who observed him driving erratically, then 
“fidgeting” in the driver’s seat as if moving an object.489  The 
officer arrested Crawford for reckless driving, and then opened the 
center console expecting to find a weapon.490  Instead, the officer 
found crack cocaine and paraphernalia, which served as evidence 
toward Crawford’s conviction for misconduct involving a 
controlled substance.491  The court of appeals held that the search 
was justified as incident to arrest and the officer had an articulable 
and reasonable basis to conclude that the console contained a 
weapon.492 
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In Custer v. State,493 the court of appeals held that the 
composite jail time for multiple offenses is the relevant factor in 
reviewing the length of a sentence.494  Custer was convicted on two 
assault counts, and sentenced to five years imprisonment with four 
years suspended in each case.495  After multiple probation 
violations, the superior court revoked Custer’s probation and 
imposed the remaining 38 months on one count and three months 
on the other.496  Custer appealed the 38-month sentence, arguing 
that it violated sentencing rules and was mistakenly severe.497  The 
court of appeals upheld the long sentence because it was part of a 
composite and the combined time was justified by Custer’s 
repeated probation violations.498  The court concluded that Custer’s 
composite sentence was not mistakenly severe given his criminal 
history, his two felony convictions, and his probation violations.499 
In Dayton v. State,500 the court of appeals affirmed a 
superior court ruling admitting DNA profile evidence in a sexual 
assault case.501  Dayton argued that expert testimony was 
inadmissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 703 because the state 
failed to establish reliability of the Athabascan DNA database on 
which the expert relied.502  The superior court determined that the 
database was reliable under Rule 703 because it constituted the 
type of data that DNA experts rely upon and because it was 
described in a peer-reviewed publication.503  The court of appeals 
held that the superior court’s finding that the database was reliable 
was supported by substantial evidence.504 
In Frank v. State,505 the court of appeals held that the 
Alaska Parole Board did not provide an adequate basis for its 
denial of a prison inmate’s application for discretionary parole.506  
After serving twenty years of a life sentence, Frank was denied 
discretionary parole and told that he could reapply only after 
serving an additional ten years.507  The court held that pursuant to 
statutory law the Board must provide sufficient details in a denial 
of parole such that an inmate can guide his future behavior and 
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prepare for a more successful future application.508  Further, 
sufficient detail is necessary because a reviewing court must be 
able to determine whether parole was denied for an impermissible 
reason.509  The court ordered the Board to reissue a revised 
decision because it failed to sufficiently describe the deficiencies 
of Frank’s release plan.510 
 In Goldsbury v. State,511 the court of appeals held that the 
superior court committed a procedural error by failing to require 
the defendant’s attorney to give a detailed explanation of why he 
believed his client had no arguable claims for post-conviction 
relief.512  Goldsbury’s court-appointed counsel filed a certificate 
conceding that his client had no arguable claim for post-conviction 
relief.513  The court of appeals held that a certificate filed pursuant 
to Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B) must contain sufficient 
detail to allow the superior court to independently assess whether 
the defendant has any potential claims for post-conviction relief.514  
The court held that Goldsbury’s attorney failed to meet this 
standard because the certificate was conclusory and lacked 
sufficient factual detail.515  Therefore, the superior court did not 
fulfill its obligation to independently assess the potential merit of 
Goldsbury’s claims under Alaska.516 
 In Gross v. State,517 the court of appeals held that the 
superior court’s exclusion of testimony offered as character 
evidence constituted harmless error.518  At trial, Gross attempted to 
call a character witness, but the court ruled that the evidence would 
be inadmissible unless Gross testified as well.519  Gross testified 
and did not further contest the issue.520  The court of appeals held 
that the evidence was admissible even if Gross did not testify.521  
However, the error was harmless because Gross did not contend 
that the ruling affected his decision to testify.522 
In Guerre-Chaley v. State,523 the court of appeals held that 
an expert opinion based on scientific evidence is not admissible 
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under Alaska Evidence Rule 703 unless the underlying evidence 
meets the Daubert-Coon test.524  Guerre-Chaley was charged with 
driving while intoxicated.525  At trial, the judge excluded the 
results of a preliminary breath test because the defense did not 
present evidence to establish that the test satisfied the Daubert-
Coon standard of scientific validity.526  On appeal, Guerre-Chaley 
argued that the results of the breath test were admissible under 
Rule 703, which permits an expert witness to base an opinion on 
otherwise inadmissible scientific evidence as long as other experts 
reasonably rely on such evidence.527  The court of appeals 
disagreed, holding that Rule 703 requires that data underlying a 
scientific conclusion also must meet the Daubert-Coon test for 
admissibility.528 
In Herrin v. State,529 the court of appeals held that the 
superior court is not required to order explicitly the tolling of a 
defendant’s probation when the judge orally pronounces a 
defendant’s sentence.530  Herrin was serving a prison sentence for 
first-degree stalking and assault against his then-wife.531  Shortly 
before he was released on parole, he wrote threatening letters to 
her.532  Herrin was indicted for first-degree stalking and the state 
petitioned the superior court to revoke his probation.533  The 
superior court revoked Herrin’s prior probation date and extended 
the probation period by the length of time the petition was 
pending.534  Herrin argued that the court erred because the judge 
did not orally order revocation of his probation; however, while an 
oral proclamation controls when there is a discrepancy between the 
written judgment and the oral sentence in discretionary matters, 
this rule does not apply to non-discretionary matters set by 
statute.535  Here the disputed issue was covered by statute, 
therefore it was inconsequential that the judge did not orally 
revoke Herrin’s probation sentencing.536 
In Hertz v. State,537 the court of appeals held that it did not 
have jurisdiction to consider a post-conviction petition from a state 
prisoner alleging improper and unconstitutional treatment by the 
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Alaska Department of Corrections.538  Hertz, an inmate convicted 
of second-degree murder, claimed that he was denied adequate 
legal assistance and medical care in prison and was subject to 
retaliation by the Department of Corrections after filing a petition 
for post-conviction relief.539  The court of appeals noted that state 
law provides that procedural matters related to conviction and 
sentencing be brought before that court.540  However, the state 
supreme court was the proper venue for raising prison condition 
and disciplinary claims.541  Therefore, the court of appeals 
dismissed Hertz’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.542    
In James v. State,543 the supreme court held that the trial 
court improperly failed to consider whether a recantation by the 
key prosecution witness would have resulted in James’ acquittal in 
a new trial.544 James had been convicted of sexual assault and 
sexual abuse of a minor, largely on the strength of the testimony of 
Danielle M., a fourteen year-old girl claiming to have seen the 
assault.545  When Danielle later recanted her testimony in an 
affidavit, James appealed for a new trial.546  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court found that the recantation was not 
credible.547  James appealed, arguing the court had erred in basing 
its denial entirely upon the credibility of the recantation.548  The 
supreme court agreed, holding that the proper standard required the 
trial court to consider whether the recantation, in addition to all 
other evidence, would likely result in an acquittal at a new trial.549 
In Jeffries v. State,550 the court of appeals found no error in 
the admission of evidence of Jeffries’ prior bad acts, and that there 
was a sufficient showing of the defendant’s mental state for the 
jury to convict him of second-degree murder.551  Driving while 
intoxicated, Jeffries turned in front of another vehicle, and his 
passenger died in the ensuing collision.552  Jeffries was convicted 
of second-degree murder, which requires a reckless state of mind 
demonstrating “an extreme indifference to the value of human 
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life.”553  The State introduced evidence to establish “extreme 
indifference,” including facts related to Jeffries’ recidivism and 
consumption of alcohol in violation of his probation on the date of 
the accident.554  Jeffries argued that there was insufficient evidence 
to support his conviction because his mental state should only be 
inferred from his actions while driving and his only demonstrated 
driving error was a left turn into an oncoming vehicle.555  The 
court evaluated the difference between manslaughter and second-
degree murder, and concluded the question for the jury was 
whether the defendant’s “level of awareness of the risk” was equal 
to or greater than “recklessness” as defined by the statute.556  The 
court held that the jury was entitled to consider the evidence 
submitted by the State to evaluate whether or not Jeffries acted 
with such extreme recklessness to warrant a murder conviction.557  
Consequently, evidence admitted to show the degree of the 
defendant’s recklessness was not unfairly prejudicial, and Jeffries’ 
conviction was affirmed.558   
In Johnson v. State,559 the court of appeals held that 
evidence of cocaine possession was admissible when discovered 
during a search incident to arrest for a “minor on licensed 
premises” violation.560  A city police officer arrested Johnson for 
being in a bar and underage alcohol consumption.561  Patting down 
Johnson’s pockets, the officer found four small bags of cocaine.562  
Johnson moved to suppress this evidence as beyond the scope of a 
search for weapons or for evidence related to crimes for which the 
police have probable cause to arrest. 563  The court of appeals 
upheld the search because evidence supporting a “minor on 
licensed premises” charge could be concealed on an individual’s 
person.564 
In Keller v. State,565 the court of appeals affirmed the lower 
court’s denial of Keller’s motion to dismiss because the delay in 
bringing Keller to trial was for good cause.566  Charges against 
Keller alleging that he drove intoxicated were originally filed in 
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the Bethel district court.567  However, the case was ultimately 
assigned to a judge in Fairbanks after three judges recused 
themselves due to their professional relationship with Keller’s 
father, the local bailiff.568  As a result of the delay caused by the 
recusals and reassignments, Keller was not brought to trial within 
the 120 days required.569  Judges have a duty to recuse themselves 
not only when they cannot be fair and unbiased but also when a 
reasonable person may question their impartiality.570  The court of 
appeals held that the four-day delay in this case was excused 
because it was for good cause.571    
In Landt v. State,572 the court of appeals held that a trial 
court judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing jurors to pose 
questions to witnesses in a criminal trial.573  Landt was convicted 
of driving while intoxicated and tampering with evidence, but 
acquitted of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.574  
At trial, the judge allowed the jury to submit questions for 
witnesses.575  The jury presented fifty-two questions, of which the 
judge put forth forty-two to the witnesses.576  The court of appeals 
determined that the judge had avoided compromising the jury’s 
impartiality by reviewing the submitted questions with counsel for 
both parties outside the jury’s presence.577   
In Larkin v. State,578 the court of appeals held that a defect 
in form in the indictment was not grounds for reversing a jury 
verdict as long as it did not prejudice the ability of the defendant to 
prepare or present a defense.579  Larkin was convicted for second-
degree sexual abuse of a minor.580  On appeal, Larkin argued that 
because the date specified in the indictment was not the same date 
shown by the evidence, he could not be convicted as a matter of 
law.581  Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals concluded 
that the allegation of date is not an element of a crime unless made 
material by the statute defining the offense.582  The outcome of a 
trial cannot be affected by a defect of form in the indictment unless 
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it can be shown that the defect prejudiced the substantial rights of 
the defendant.583  
In MacDonald v. State,584 the court of appeals dismissed a 
petition for post-conviction relief.585  MacDonald was convicted of 
second degree escape after he fled from police.586  In his appeal for 
post-conviction relief, MacDonald asserted that his trial attorney 
was incompetent for failing to argue that his conduct did not 
constitute second-degree escape, because the police had not yet 
arrested him but merely touched him.587  The court of appeals held, 
however, that an arrest is complete if the arrestee is touched by an 
officer, even if the officer “does not succeed in stopping or holding 
[him] even for an instant.”588  The court of appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal of MacDonald’s petition for post-
conviction relief because he was under arrest, according to the 
common law definition, at the time he escaped.589   
In Nason v. State,590 the court of appeals held that the trial 
court judge erred by allowing Nason to be shackled in front of a 
jury without a hearing to determine whether restraints were 
necessary.591  Nason was convicted of first degree assault and third 
degree weapon misconduct.592  At trial, Nason’s wrists and ankles 
were shackled.593  Nason’s attorney objected to the shackles, but 
the trial court judge refused to hold a hearing on the necessity of 
the restraints.594  On appeal, the court of appeals held that the judge 
erred by failing to hold a hearing, but remanded to the trial court to 
determine whether Nason was prejudiced by the error.595  Also on 
appeal, Nason argued that the police did not have valid consent to 
search the cabin in which he was found.596  The court of appeals 
held that the victim of the assault, who was the owner of the cabin, 
had given valid consent.597    
In Parker v. State,598 the court of appeals denied Parker’s 
request that the court reconsider allowing him to withdraw his plea 
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bargain agreement.599  Parker was indicted for unlawful 
exploitation of a minor, possession of child pornography, third 
degree controlled substance abuse, interference with official 
proceedings and three counts of first-degree controlled substance 
abuse.600 Parker initially pleaded no contest to the three felonies in 
a plea bargain with the state, but later tried to withdraw his 
pleas.601  Parker sought to withdraw his plea on the ground that he 
had misunderstood the strategic consequences of losing a 
suppression motion.602  The court of appeals rejected this petition 
because nothing in the record supported his contention.603  
However, the court did find that Parker had successfully offered 
mitigating evidence for two of his crimes and remanded the case to 
the lower court for resentencing.604 
 In Powell v. State,605 the court of appeals held that a 
consecutive sentence imposed for multiple violations of the same 
offense may exceed the maximum allowable sentence for a single 
offense if the defendant poses a danger to the public safety and 
previous attempts at rehabilitation have failed.606  Powell was 
convicted of two counts of first-degree assault, one count of 
reckless endangerment, and one count of driving while intoxicated 
in connection with a vehicular accident in which four persons were 
injured.607  Citing Powell’s criminal history,608 the trial judge 
sentenced him to 26 years in prison.609  Powell argued on appeal 
that the sentence was too harsh because it exceeded the twenty-
year maximum for first-degree assault and was longer than any 
sentence imposed for vehicular manslaughter.610  The court of 
appeals upheld the consecutive sentence, finding it justified by 
Powell’s extensive criminal history.611  
In Reichel v. State,612 the court of appeals held that an 
investigative stop of a parolee was improper because there was no 
evidence indicating that the parolee’s conduct posed an imminent 
                                                 
599 Id. at 199. 
600 Id. at 196.  
601 Id. at 195. 
602 Id.  
603 Id. at 199. 
604 Id. at 200. 
605 88 P.3d 532 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
606 Id. at 539. 
607 Id. at 533. 
608 Id. at 536.  This history included three prior felony convictions, eleven 
convictions for driving while intoxicated, eight convictions for driving on a 
suspended license, and numerous other misdemeanors.  Id. at 534. 
609 Id. at 538. 
610 Id. at 533.  
611 Id. at 539. 
612 101 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 44
danger to public safety.613  Reichel, on parole following a DWI 
conviction, was observed by police officers as he violated the 
terms of his parole, which prohibited him from either consuming 
alcohol or being on premises where alcoholic beverages are 
sold.614  After stopping Reichel and contacting his parole officer, 
the police officers searched Reichel and found cocaine in his 
pocket.615  The trial court denied Reichel’s motion to suppress the 
cocaine evidence during a trial for controlled substances 
misconduct.616  Without evidence that Reichel posed an imminent 
threat to public safety by driving while intoxicated, the court of 
appeals held that the investigative stop was not authorized and that 
the suppression of evidence motion should have been granted.617 
In Riggins v. State,618 the court of appeals held that the 
superior court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence that 
a criminal defendant accused of assaulting his girlfriend had 
committed prior assaults against a different girlfriend.619  After 
admitting evidence that Riggins had previously committed assaults 
on a prior girlfriend, the lower court convicted Riggins of assault 
in the second degree for striking his girlfriend in the face with a 
dangerous instrument.620  The court of appeals held that although 
the evidence did suggest defendant's character to become violent, 
the state had more relevant evidence to establish this character 
trait, including defendant's prior assaults on his current 
girlfriend.621 Additionally, the danger of unfair prejudice from 
admitting the evidence of these assaults outweighed its 
probativity.622  Therefore, the court could not find that admission 
of the evidence constituted harmless error and reversed Riggins’s 
conviction.623 
In Ritter v. State,624 the court of appeals held that a crime 
for which the defendant was separately convicted and sentenced 
could not serve as an aggravating factor in determining the 
sentence for another crime.625  Ritter, a massage therapist, was 
indicted for sexually assaulting three of his clients and pled no 
contest to a single count of second-degree assault.626  After 
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sentencing, Ritter challenged his plea and it was set aside.627  Ritter 
was then convicted at trial for the three original counts and an 
additional count that occurred while he was out on bail.628  The 
court of appeals upheld the four convictions concluding there was 
sufficient evidence that Ritter’s sexual contact was made without 
consent.629  Ritter also appealed his sentence on four different 
theories.  First, he claimed that it violated his right to due process 
because it was greater than the sentence he initially received under 
his plea bargain.630  The court rejected this argument because 
Ritter chose to challenge and set aside his plea.631   Second, Ritter 
claimed his sentence was excessive because it was greater than the 
presumptive term for a second time offender.632  Although Ritter 
was a first time offender, the court held that the judge had good 
reason for exceeding the presumptive term considering the nature 
of Ritter’s four counts.633  Third, Ritter challenged the conclusion 
that his crime was “aggravated” because his victims were 
particularly vulnerable.634  The court held that his victims were 
vulnerable due to the therapist-patient relationship.635  Fourth, 
Ritter argued that the judge erred in finding his conduct was 
aggravated because of repeated sexual assaults.636  The court 
agreed and held that Ritter’s separate conviction could not be 
double counted as an aggravating fact.637  As a result, the court 
remanded for consideration of a new sentence without this 
aggravator.638    
In Sipary v. State,639 the court of appeals affirmed Sipary’s 
conviction, rejecting the application of both the common law and 
evidentiary “rule of completeness” and the “excited utterance” 
hearsay exception.640  The State charged Sipary with first-degree 
assault, on the theory that he initially injured the victim in self-
defense but then went well beyond the bounds of self-defense 
when he continued to beat the victim to exact retribution for an 
earlier incident.641  To prove its case, the State introduced various 
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witness statements.642  Sipary argued that the State introduced 
partial statements that violated the common law rule of 
completeness as well as the Alaska Rules of Evidence by taking 
these selected portions out of context.643  In finding that the 
relevant rule does not give a party an absolute right to introduce 
omitted portions of a statement except where relevant and 
necessary to a proper understanding of previously admitted 
portions, 644 the court held that the rule of completeness was 
inapplicable because Sipary’s counsel did not preserve the issue 
for appeal by objecting in a timely manner to the select 
testimony.645  Further, the court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that certain out-of-court statements should have been admissible 
under the “excited utterance” exception of Alaska Evidence Rule 
803(2),646 because defense counsel failed to make a proper offer of 
proof and such statements did not appear to be made in a sufficient 
state of excitement to justify waiving reliability concerns.647  
Therefore, the court upheld Sipary’s conviction.648 
In Smith v. State,649 the court of appeals held that an 
anonymous phone call can give a police officer reasonable 
suspicion to pull over a potentially intoxicated driver.650  Smith 
was arrested for driving while intoxicated, following an 
anonymous call to the police.651  Smith argued that evidence from 
his DWI stop should have been suppressed because the police stop 
was not supported by reasonable suspicion of driving while 
intoxicated.652  The court of appeals held that an anonymous call 
gave police reasonable suspicion that a driver was intoxicated, 
reasoning such a phone call would probably come from a person 
that observed the offender.653  Smith also argued that his prior 
DWIs from Arkansas were improperly considered in deeming him 
a second felony offender, given differences in Arkansas and 
Alaska DWI laws.654   The court held that Alaska DWI laws 
governed in determining whether the dates of Smith’s previous 
DWIs were sufficiently recent for him to be considered a second 
felony offender.655  The court held that Smith should have been 
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sentenced as a first-time felony offender.  The court reasoned that 
the district court should have considered whether or not Smith 
would have been a first or second-time felony offender, if the 
Arkansas DWIs had occurred in Alaska.656 
In Sheridan v. Municipality of Anchorage,657 the court of 
appeals held that the defendant’s prior convictions could be 
considered in determining his mandatory minimum sentence for 
driving while intoxicated.658  Sheridan was previously convicted 
for driving while intoxicated under a now invalid Anchorage 
ordinance.659  Because Sheridan did not explain in his briefing why 
the invalidity of a similar state statute rendered his prior 
convictions invalid, the court held that the briefing was inadequate 
and constituted a waiver of his claim.660  In addition, the court held 
that, even if Sheridan had adequately briefed his argument, it 
would still have failed because he could not present evidence to 
show that he was previously convicted under the allegedly invalid 
provision of the ordinance.661 
In State v. Andrews,662 the court of appeals held that the use 
of Loran C readings without their corresponding printouts to show 
a violation of commercial fishing laws in a criminal trial was not a 
due process violation.663  Andrews was charged with fishing in 
closed waters after Fish and Wildlife Protection troopers had used 
Loran C technology to determine the location of his fishing 
vessel.664 Andrews moved to exclude this evidence because the 
troopers failed to preserve a record of the readings and because the 
state failed to demonstrate that the troopers were adequately 
trained to use Loran C technology.665  The court of appeals 
affirmed the admissibility of such evidence, holding that the state 
was not required to maintain a record of Loran C readings because 
commercial fishers had the ability to independently obtain Loran C 
readings from equipment on their own fishing vessels.666  In 
addition, the court held that there was evidence that the troopers 
were sufficiently qualified to use Loran C technology, despite the 
fact that the state had no formal training procedures.667    
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In State v. Blank,668 the supreme court held that a 
warrantless breath test of a driver is potentially valid under Alaska 
law when exigent circumstances exist. Blank fatally struck a 
pedestrian while driving home and failed to stop.669  The 
investigating officer obtained a warrantless breath test after being 
told by Blank that she had consumed alcohol prior to driving home 
that night.670  The court of appeals reversed Blank’s convictions, 
holding that Alaska Statutes section 28.35.031(g) violated federal 
and state constitutional protections against unlawful searches and 
seizures.  The court of appeals reasoned that exigent circumstances 
could not exist where Blank had not been placed under arrest 
before or substantially contemporaneously with the breath test.671  
The supreme court reversed, holding that the warrantless search of 
Blank’s breath may have been a valid and constitutional exigent 
circumstance.672 In reversing, the court expressly overruled the 
requirement from Layland v. State673 that justification of exigent 
circumstances requires a prior or substantially contemporaneous 
arrest.674  Therefore, the court remanded for further factual 
determinations of whether exigent circumstances did exist.675 
In State v. Crocker,676 the court of appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of charges and the suppression of evidence from an 
illegal search of the defendant’s home.677  Crocker was indicted for 
fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct after police “found 
marijuana plants, harvested marijuana, and marijuana-growing 
equipment.”678 However, in order to obtain a search warrant to 
gather evidence of marijuana possession, the state must establish 
the limits that are constitutionally protected under Ravin v. State,679 
and Noy v. State680.681 The court affirmed the superior court’s 
ruling that such probable cause was not established and thus all 
evidence obtained from that search warrant must be suppressed.682 
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In State v. Semancik,683 the supreme court overruled Adkins 
v. State,684 a prior decision that permitted a defendant to challenge 
a burglary indictment for the first time on appeal.685  After 
Semancik was convicted of attempted burglary in the first degree, 
he successfully challenged the indictment on the grounds that it did 
not specify the crime that he intended to commit in the dwelling.686  
On the State’s appeal, the supreme court affirmed part of its prior 
holding in Adkins by continuing to require the State to specify a 
defendant’s intended crime in a burglary indictment.687  However, 
the court overruled the Adkins holding that a failure to include the 
intended crime is a substantive defect.688  Rather, the court found 
this defect to be one of form that cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal.689  Thus, the court reinstated Semancik’s conviction 
because its decision was applied retroactively and his rights were 
not prejudiced by the defective indictment.690  
In Valencia v. State,691 the court of appeals held that credit 
for good behavior could only be earned by prisoners serving 
sentences in correctional facilities and could not be earned by 
residents of a court-ordered alcohol rehabilitation center.692  Upon 
revocation of his parole, Valencia was sentenced to prison and 
awarded credit against his sentence for 437 days spent in a court-
ordered alcohol rehabilitation center.693  Valencia argued that he 
should be awarded an additional 146 days of “good time” credit, 
equivalent to what he would have received had he served an 
equivalent period of time in prison.694  Valencia appealed the 
superior court’s refusal to award the additional credit.695  The court 
affirmed, holding that a state statute696 restricted such “good time” 
credit to prisoners in correctional facilities.697 The court reasoned 
that inmates in rehabilitation programs, for whom misbehavior 
results in return to prison, already have incentive for good 
behavior.698 
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In Way v. State,699 the court of appeals held that a state 
trooper had probable cause to stop a vehicle for having an illegible 
license plate.700  Way challenged the stop of his vehicle as 
pretextual, based on the trooper’s suspicion that Way was using his 
vehicle as a methamphetamine lab.701  The court held that the 
trooper had probable cause to stop the vehicle because the license 
plate was not clearly legible.702  Because the stop was based on a 
legitimate law enforcement objective, the court did not address the 
constitutionality of pretext traffic stops.703 
In Way v. State,704 the court of appeals held that, under 
certain circumstances during a search, police have the authority to 
restrain and frisk occupants of a building.705 Way was restrained in 
a private home while the police executed a search for an escaped 
fugitive.706 Based on the police’s prior knowledge of the 
defendant, Way was singled out for “special questioning” and was 
frisked.707 During the frisk, the police found drug paraphernalia, 
and Way was arrested for “fourth-degree controlled substance 
misconduct.”708 He appealed, claiming that the methods the police 
used to discover the drug paraphernalia were illegal.709  
Specifically, Way argued that “the officers had no authority to 
detain him at the scene, handcuff him, and subject him to 
questioning.”710 Relying primarily on the United State Supreme 
Court’s decision in Michigan v. Summers,711 the Alaska Court of 
Appeals held that temporarily restraining the occupants while 
executing the search was reasonable.712 However, absent the 
necessary prerequisite “suspicion of criminal activity,” the 
continued detention of Way beyond the completion of the search 
was unjustified.713 Furthermore, the court held that police are not 
authorized to frisk individuals who are present, but are apparently 
unconnected to the crime, during a search unless there is “some 
additional affirmative indication” that the individuals are “armed 
and presently dangerous.”714 In this case, the police’s prior 
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knowledge of Way in relation to drug use and weapon possession 
justified the frisk.715 
In Whitesides v. State,716 the court of appeals held that a 
buyer’s fatal overdose was not an aggravating factor in the 
sentencing of a defendant convicted of selling a controlled 
substance.717  Whitesides was arrested and charged with second-
degree substance misconduct for selling heroin to a user who 
overdosed and died.718  The sentencing judge added two-and-a-half 
suspended years to Whitesides’s sentence after finding an 
aggravating factor: that a person, other than an accomplice, 
sustained physical injury as a direct result of Whitesides’s 
conduct.719  The court of appeals reversed, holding that the term 
“direct result” signaled the legislature’s intent to require a closer 
connection between cause and effect than would be required to 
establish proximate cause.720  Recognizing that Whitesides’s 
conduct was egregious, however, the court of appeals remanded 
the case with specific authorization to consider the applicability of 
another aggravating factor.721 
In Wholecheese v. State,722 the supreme court held that the 
refusal of a defendant’s request for a specific venue was within the 
trial court’s discretion.723  Wholecheese was indicted on several 
felony charges in Galena.724  Wholecheese moved to have the 
venue changed from Fairbanks to Galena, which was not an 
approved felony venue.725  The superior court held the trial would 
be held in Nenana.726  The supreme court held Wholecheese did 
not meet his burden to show the jury pool in Nanana was 
insufficient and the trial judge did not abuse her discretion.727  
 
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
In Barry v. University of Alaska,728 the supreme court held 
that a pre-retirement release did not bar an employee’s claim for 
enforcement of a promise to be performed after the release was 
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executed.729  Barry negotiated an agreement with the University of 
Alaska, his employer, in which the university agreed to give Barry 
credit for twenty years of service in order for Barry to secure 
certain benefits from a newly implemented retirement incentive 
program.730  In exchange, Barry signed a document releasing the 
university from any future claims related to his employment.731  
When his first benefit check did not reflect the terms of this 
agreement, Barry sued the university.732  The superior court 
granted summary judgment for the university, holding that the 
release barred the litigation.733  The supreme court reversed 
because the promise by the university to credit Barry with twenty 
years of service had to be performed after the release was 
signed.734  The supreme court held that summary judgment was 
erroneously granted because no reasonable person in Barry’s 
position would believe that the release barred a suit for breach of 
contract that occurred after the release was executed.735 
In Bd. of Trade Inc., v. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour 
Administration,736 the supreme court held that a hearing officer had 
improperly relied on an overly narrow test to determine that a 
location was “on-site” for the purposes of the Little Davis-Bacon 
Act  (“Act”).737  Board of Trade, Inc. argued that the Camp Nome 
Quarry was not “on-site” for the purposes of the Act and that it 
was therefore not obligated to pay the prevailing wage for work 
performed at the location.738  The supreme court reiterated that the 
hearing officer should have considered the following in making his 
decision: “the normal meaning of ‘adjacent’ and ‘nearby;’” “the 
availability of alternative closer sites;” “the physical lay-out of the 
project;” and “whether the area was developed or undeveloped.”739  
However, the hearing officer applied a different, narrower test.740 
The supreme court applied the correct test to the factual findings 
and determined that the location was not “on-site.”741    
In Blackburn v. State,742 the supreme court held that 
probationary state employees are at-will employees, dischargeable 
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at any time with or without cause.743  Blackburn had worked for 
the state for less than three months in early 2000, when the state 
terminated him for inadequate performance, including failure to 
follow instructions and failure to operate equipment in an 
appropriate manner.744  Blackburn filed a grievance through his 
union, which was dropped once the union learned of Blackburn’s 
probationary status.745  Blackburn sued the state for wrongful 
termination, denial of due process, and misrepresentation.746  The 
supreme court, on appeal of a grant of summary judgment  in favor 
of the state, affirmed, holding that it could find nothing in the state 
statutes, state personnel rules, or the collective bargaining 
agreement to indicate that state probationary employees were not 
employees at will.747  As an at-will employee, Blackburn did not 
have a property right in his continued employment and, therefore, 
was not denied due process.748   
 In Brown v. Patriot Maintenance, Inc.,749 the supreme court 
affirmed the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board’s denial of 
disability benefits.750  Brown claimed that she suffered from work-
related fibromyalgia; however, the independent medical examiners 
expressed the opinion that her condition was psychiatric and not 
work-related.751  After the Board denied her benefit, Brown argued 
that the Board failed to resolve doubtful medical evidence in her 
favor and failed to address her lay witnesses’ testimony.752  The 
supreme court reaffirmed that the Board has the sole power to 
determine how to weigh the evidence; thus, review of its decisions 
is deferential.753  The court held that the rule requiring that doubt 
be resolved in the claimant’s favor did not extend to Brown’s case 
because the conflicting medical testimony simply represented a 
difference of opinion and not a serious doubt as to any single 
expert’s testimony.754    The supreme court further held that the lay 
evidence in this case was not material, and the Board was not 
required to discuss it at length.755  The supreme court reaffirmed 
the denial of disability benefits, finding that the Board’s decision 
was adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence.756 
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In Casey v. SEMCO Energy, Inc.,757 the supreme court held 
that an employer did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing when, acting on the advice of counsel, it declined to 
include two terminated employees in an Early Retirement Plan 
(ERP).758  Casey and Sinclair were employed as managers by 
ENSTAR Natural Gas Company.759  In November 1999, SEMCO 
Energy, Inc. purchased ENSTAR and terminated both Casey and 
Sinclair.760  As part of a negotiated severance agreement, SEMCO 
agreed to include Casey and Sinclair in an ERP established for 
other former ENSTAR employees, provided that doing so would 
not disqualify the ERP from tax-exempt status.761  According to 
the terms of the agreement, determination of whether adding Casey 
and Sinclair to the ERP would cause loss of tax-exempt status was 
to be made by SEMCO's counsel and subject SEMCO's sole 
judgment in good faith.762  In affirming the decision of the superior 
court, the supreme court held that the terms of the agreement only 
required SEMCO to obtain a good faith opinion from its counsel as 
to how including the two managers would affect the ERP's tax-
exempt status.763 Having done this, SEMCO had no further 
obligations to Casey and Sinclair with respect to the ERP.764 The 
court concluded that under the agreement SEMCO was not 
required to find alternative means of applying the benefits of the 
ERP to Casey and Sinclair, nor did SEMCO violate the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to exhaust all possible 
means of doing so.765 
In Chalovich v. State,766 the supreme court held that 
Chalovich made a timely payment and therefore did not abandon 
his state mining claims.767  To maintain a mining claim, the Alaska 
Administrative Code requires a miner either to put in some 
minimum amount of labor each year or to make a payment by 
September 1.  The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) found 
that Chalovich had abandoned his state mining claims because he 
failed to make a timely payment.768  Chalovich argued that even 
though his payment was received after the deadline, the DNR 
should treat his payment as timely.769  He also argued that the 
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section of the code that requires annual labor is “arbitrary and 
inconsistent with other regulatory deadlines.”770  The supreme 
court held that the Alaska Administrative Code’s provision of 
payment in lieu of annual labor by September 1 was valid,771 
because it was “created by the legislature, and it is consistent with 
federal law.”772  However, contrary to the provisions of the DNR 
regulation, the court held that as long as a payment is postmarked 
by September 1, forfeiture cannot be imposed on a miner.773  
Because his payment was postmarked before the September 1 
deadline, the court reversed DNR’s decision that Chalovich 
forfeited his mining rights.774  
In Cowen v. Wal-Mart,775 the supreme court held that the 
medical opinions of two physician specialists constituted sufficient 
evidence to allow the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board to 
conclude that a claimed injury was not work-related.776  Cowen, an 
employee of Wal-Mart, sought to receive workers’ compensation 
benefits for the deflation of a saline implant.777  In arguing that 
Cowen’s implant was not work-related, Wal-Mart relied upon the 
expert opinions of two doctors.778  Cowen argued that these 
medical opinions should not rebut the presumption of 
compensability because they were speculative and 
unsubstantiated.779  The court held that the medical opinions were 
adequate to rebut the presumption of compensability, despite the 
fact that the opinions contained a degree of medical uncertainty.780  
The court affirmed the Board’s determination that Cowen failed to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury was work-
related.781 
In Excursion Inlet Packing Co. v. Ugale,782 the supreme 
court affirmed per curiam the superior court’s reversal of an 
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decision to deny 
compensation for Ugale’s death.783  Ugale’s family argued that his 
death should be presumed compensable because it arose out of his 
employment with Excursion Inlet Packing Co.784  However, the 
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Board agreed with the employer that Ugale’s death was not 
compensable because Ugale quit before he died and was no longer 
on the premises when he disappeared.785  The superior court 
reversed, finding that a presumption of compensability should 
attach and that the employer failed to rebut that presumption with 
any substantial evidence.786  The supreme court affirmed for 
reasons set forth in the superior court opinion and reprinted that 
opinion in an appendix.787   
In Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey,788 the supreme 
court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar a 
retail manager from asserting overtime compensation claims under 
the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) that were more than two 
years old due to circumstances that prevented him from bringing 
his claims earlier.789  While Bailey worked as a manager for Fred 
Meyer he did not receive overtime compensation because the 
company classified him as exempt.790  As a threshold matter, the 
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Bailey devoted 
nearly sixty percent of his time to non-management tasks and was 
therefore not exempt under AWHA.791  The supreme court then 
affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant recovery for the 
company’s older violations, finding that the lower court’s equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations was proper.  The court based its 
finding on the fact that Bailey was prevented from bringing claims 
because he was threatened by his employer from participation in 
the earlier class action lawsuit alleging the same overtime 
compensation claims.792   
In Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates,793 the supreme court held 
that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board did not have the 
authority to reimburse an employee for miscellaneous costs 
incurred as a consequence of a work-related injury, and that his 
guardian had the authority to dismiss the suit for reimbursement.794  
Gunter, an employee of Kathy-O-Estates, was severely injured as a 
result of an on-the-job accident and was entitled to benefits under 
the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. 795  Gunter’s guardian and 
attorney settled the workers’ compensation disputes by signing a 
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Compromise and Release form.796  Nevertheless, Gunter argued 
that Kathy-O-Estates should reimburse him for a variety of costs 
he incurred subsequent to his injury.797  The supreme court held 
that Gunter could not be reimbursed because the costs fell outside 
the narrow confines of workers’ compensation benefits.798  Gunter 
also challenged his guardian’s decision to dismiss his claims for 
reimbursement.799  The court held that Gunter’s guardian was 
properly appointed and therefore had the authority to reasonably 
dismiss Gunter’s challenge to the Compromise and Release 
form.800  
In Hutka v. Sisters of Providence in Washington,801 the 
supreme court held that the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) 
did not apply to a supervisory employee who cared for patients in a 
nursing home.802  Hutka was a registered nurse who had been 
promoted to a supervisory role at Providence Hospital’s Home 
Healthcare Unit but who still provided direct medical care to 
patients on a weekly basis.803  The court concluded that individuals 
who provide direct medical care to patients as part of their regular 
job duties are exempt from coverage under AWHA.804  The court 
concluded, however, that the employer’s behavior constituted a 
willful violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
and upheld the lower court’s decision to allow a three-year, rather 
than a two-year, statute of limitations on Hutka’s FLSA claims.805 
In Kaiser v. Royal Insurance Co. of America,806 the 
supreme court stayed an individual’s appeal of an Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board’s (“Board”) decision to deny his claims until 
the validity of his Compromise and Release (“C&R”) could be 
determined.807  The court also remanded for additional findings on 
Kaiser’s claim of interference against the insurance company.808  
Kaiser challenged the Board’s decision not to address the validity 
of the C&R before denying his claims for reimbursement of 
medical expenses. 809  He also argued that there should be an 
imposition of penalties against the insurance company for late 
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payment of an MRI.810  On appeal, Kaiser argued that the C&R 
was not in his best interests, that the Board’s statements in favor of 
the C&R were fraudulent, and that his agreement to the C&R was 
made under duress.811 The court remanded the issue of whether the 
C&R was valid.812  The court also ordered that the claim of 
interference against the insurance company be remanded to 
determine whether it inappropriately influenced or attempted to 
inappropriately influence Kaiser’s physician.813 
In Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling,814 the supreme court held 
that Kinzel was entitled to a mixed motives instruction on his 
retaliatory discharge claim against Discovery and reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in Discovery’s favor.815 Kinsel 
alleged that Discovery terminated him in retaliation for filing 
safety complaints with the division of Occupational Safety and 
Health (OSH).816  At trial, Kinzel’s request for a mixed-motive 
instruction was denied.817  The supreme court reversed, holding 
that email statements reflecting an animus based on Kinzel’s 
protected conduct were sufficient to permit a jury to “infer that that 
attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the 
employer’s decision.”818   
The supreme court also reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment on defamation and intentional interference 
with a contract claim in favor of a second defendant, Hart 
Crowser.819 It concluded that an email hypothesizing that Kinzel 
sabotaged a work site could be interpreted as fact, not opinion.820  
It also concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as 
to whether Hart Crowser was responsible for Kinzel’s firing, and 
whether the company was motivated by privileged economic 
interest or improper retaliatory interest. 821    
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Gregg,822 the supreme 
court held that the Municipality of Anchorage violated Gregg’s 
right to protected leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).823  Gregg, an Anchorage police officer, had taken time 
away from work on account of her pregnancy, an automobile 
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accident, and an abusive personal relationship.824  The court 
concluded that Gregg was entitled to protection under the FMLA 
even though her doctors had not made a precise and correct 
diagnosis of her condition at the time she requested leave under the 
Act.825  The court also held that an employee does not have to 
specifically invoke the FMLA when requesting leave for a covered 
purpose and concluded that the appropriate rate of prejudgment 
interest was set by federal, not state, law.826 
In Odsather v. Richardson,827 the supreme court held that 
the trial court had insufficient facts to decide conclusively whether 
truck owners who leased their trucks to firms were employees of 
the firm or independent contractors.828   Odsather was injured in a 
vehicle accident with Richardson while both were working as truck 
drivers.829  Though the men owned their trucks, both were on lease 
to Sourdough Express.830  Odsather claimed that his injuries were 
caused by Richardson’s negligence.831  Richardson claimed that 
both he and Odsather were employees of Sourdough Express and 
that Odsather’s only remedy was under worker’s compensation.832  
Under Alaska’s “relative nature of the work” test, the court 
examined the degree of skill required, whether the worker puts 
himself out as a separate business, and whether the claimant bears 
accident risk.833  The court reversed and remanded, holding that the 
trial court did not have sufficient facts to decide whether, under the 
relative nature of the work test, the drivers were employees of 
Sourdough Express or independent contractors.834   
 In Raad v. Alaska State Commissionn for Human Rights,835 
the supreme court held that a hearing officer of the Alaska State 
Commission for Human Rights incorrectly concluded that there 
was no evidence to support a finding of discriminatory 
retaliation.836  Raad, a Muslim woman of Lebanese descent, 
brought a complaint against the school district alleging she had 
been the victim of discrimination on the basis of her religion and 
national origin.837  Specifically, Raad pointed to the fact that, in 
spite of her qualifications, she had been denied employment by the 
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school district on thirty-one separate occasions.838  In reversing a 
decision of the superior court upholding the hearing officer’s 
dismissal of the retaliation claim, the supreme court noted that 
while the school district had articulated legitimate reasons for its 
decision not to hire Raad, she had presented evidence sufficient to 
at least suggest that the reasons were merely pretextual.839  This 
was inconsistent, the court held, with the hearing officer’s finding 
that Raad had presented no evidence of pretext.840  Given this 
inconsistency, the court reversed the decision of the superior court 
and remanded the case for further consideration regarding the 
evidence of pretext.841  
X. ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In Matter of the Reinstatement of Wiederholt,842 the Alaska 
Supreme Court accepted, without comment, the recommendation 
of the Alaska Bar Association’s Disciplinary Board that Jon E. 
Wiederholt not be reinstated as an attorney.843  The court attached 
the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation to its opinion.  Their 
recommendation indicates that Wiederholt had been disbarred for 
“extremely serious misconduct as an attorney.”844  The Bar’s 
Hearing Committee recommended reinstatement on the condition 
that Wiederholt meet regularly with a mentoring panel and that he 
continue counseling until it was “not therapeutically beneficial.”845  
Despite the Hearing Committee’s recommendation, the Bar’s 
Disciplinary Board recommended against reinstatement.846  The 
Disciplinary Board thought that Wiederholt had not had an 
adequate amount of time to recover from the conditions that led to 
his disbarment.847  The Board also believed that a supervised or 
restricted practice, as recommended by the Hearing Committee, 
was evidence that the Committee was not fully convinced of 
Wiederholt’s readiness to resume practicing.848  Finally, the Board 
noted that Wiederholt only seemed to take his rehabilitation 
seriously after the supreme court rejected his first petition for 
reinstatement.849 
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XI. FAMILY LAW 
 
In Beal v. Beal850 the supreme court upheld both the grant 
of interim spousal support and the majority of the superior court’s 
findings as to the division of marital property.851  Following a 
particularly lititgious and contentious divorce, the Beals each filed 
a series of cross-appeals regarding the terms of the interim support 
order and the division of their marital property.852  The court 
upheld the grant of the interim spousal support, noting that the 
explicit terms of the couple’s prenuptial agreement precluded only 
post-divorce alimony.853  The court also affirmed the terms of the 
interim spousal support, which included ordering the husband to 
pay arrearages and late fees related to the marital residence and 
property.854  Additionally, the court upheld the superior court’s 
determinations as to each party’s credits, finding the following:  
(1) parties are not credited appraisal costs related to non-neutral 
appraisals, unless explicitly agreed to;855 (2) a party’s offer to pay 
health insurance costs prior to the interim spousal support connotes 
that the health insurance is in addition to the interim order;856 (3) 
the superior court was correct as to various credits, regarding 
specific marital property;857 and (4) the superior court correctly 
ruled as to educational awards regarding the wife and children.858  
The court did, however, reverse the superior court’s inclusion of 
the parties’ separate property and the children’s property in 
evaluation of the award,859 as well as the superior court’s failure to 
account for appreciation of a premarital art collection.860  Finally, 
the court remanded for the determination of specific factual 
inquiries.861 
In Brynna B. v. Department of Health and Human 
Services,862 the supreme court affirmed a judgment of the superior 
court refusing to place Brynna’s niece, Jaclyn, in her care.863  The 
dispute arose when the Alaska Division of Family and Youth 
Services (DFYS) removed Brynna’s six-week old niece from 
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Brynna’s sister’s home.864  Brynna claimed that the superior court 
misinterpreted the “relative placement preference” in Alaska 
Statutes section 47.14.100 and that the superior court should have 
ordered the State to place Jaclyn in her care.865   The supreme court 
found that the superior court’s decision was not clearly erroneous 
and Brynna’s likelihood of refusing instructions to keep Jaclyn 
away from her unfit mother constituted clear and convincing 
evidence that placing Jaclyn with Brynna would be harmful to the 
child.866 
In Carl N. v. State,867 the supreme court upheld the 
termination of a father’s parental rights under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.868  The father had a history of mental and substance 
abuse problems and had repeatedly failed to conform to a 
reunification plan established by the Division of Family and Youth 
Services.869  After the trial court terminated his parental rights, the 
father appealed, claiming that he had remedied his conduct such 
that there was no risk of serious emotional harm to his son and that 
reunification was in his son’s best interest.870  The supreme court, 
however, held that the father had shown only limited progress in 
the treatment of his mental and substance abuse problems and 
upheld the termination of his parental rights.871   
In Cline v. Cline,872 the supreme court held that the superior 
court abused its discretion by awarding more than 50% of Cline’s 
pension to Lopez, his ex-wife, and remanded the case to calculate 
the correct amount owed.873  In a 1992 divorce property division, 
the trial judge awarded 18% of Cline’s pension to Lopez and set 
$500 as the monthly payment amount.874  Ten years after 
settlement, Lopez sued for a revision.875  The court awarded her 
past benefits and interest but lowered the payment amount.876  
Cline argued that this revision should apply retroactively because 
the initial amount was too high.877  The supreme court, basing its 
judgment on the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection 
Act, 878 which limits apportionment of military retirement benefits 
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to 50%, held that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
Lopez 62% of Cline’s pension.879  The supreme court reversed the 
disposition of income and set the payment amount at 50% of 
retirement benefits.880  The court also held that the imminent 
reduction of Mr. Cline’s retirement income because of disability 
payments was a proper matter for reconsideration under federal 
law.881 
In Edwards v. Edwards,882 the supreme court held that a 
husband’s motion to hold a child support order in abeyance while 
ex-wife and minor children continued to live with him was, in part, 
a prospective modification of child support based on changed 
circumstances.883  The divorce agreement of Paul and Doris 
Edwards obligated Paul to pay child support for the couple’s two 
minor children and Doris to leave the marital home, neither of 
which was performed.884  The Child Support Enforcement Division 
began to withhold a portion of Paul’s paycheck and Paul filed a 
motion for abeyance while the children lived in his household.885  
The motion largely sought impermissible retroactive modification 
of the support order for the period during which Doris and the 
children lived with him.886  However, the court remanded the case 
so the superior court could make a determination as to whether the 
motion also sought a prospective modification of the support 
order.887      
In Evans v. McTaggart,888 the supreme court held that a 
third-party must meet a clear and convincing evidence standard 
when applying for custody and visitation rights.889  Evans had two 
children, both fathered by different men.890  The McTaggarts had 
successfully filed in the trial court for custody of their biologically 
related grandchild and visitation rights with Evan’s other child.891  
On appeal, Evans claimed that the trial court violated her 
constitutional rights as a parent by granting custody to the 
McTaggarts based on a preponderance of the evidence. 892  The 
supreme court held that in custody cases between parents and non-
parents, the correct standard of review is the clear and convincing 
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evidence standard.893 Evans also challenged the McTaggerts’ 
visitation rights to her other son, who was not biologically related 
to them.894  The court held that Alaska Statutes section 
25.20.060(a),895 which “permits a court to provide for visitation 
based on the best interests of the child,” is constitutional if 
narrowly interpreted. 896  To protect parental rights, the court held 
that clear and convincing evidence should be used to determine 
whether a third-party can obtain visitation rights over the parent’s 
consent.897  
In Harris v. Westfall,898 the supreme court vacated a child 
support order proposed by the father, Westfall, and adopted by the 
superior court, finding that the order contained misrepresentations 
made by Westfall and that the mother, Harris’s, untimely objection 
was justified by the circumstances. 899   On May 31, 2002 Harris 
moved to set aside the child support order granted by the superior 
court on December 27, 2001.900  Harris claimed that her objections 
to the proposed child support order were not timely filed because 
her attorney’s secretary had been sabotaging several cases and 
never filed her objections.901  The superior court denied the motion 
without explanation.902  After her motion for clarification was 
denied, Harris appealed to the supreme court.903  The supreme 
court held that the superior court abused its discretion by denying 
Harris’s motion to vacate the child support order under Alaska 
Civil Rule 60(b).904  The supreme court held that Harris’s motion 
was timely filed given her reasonable explanation for the delay in 
filing her motion to set aside the superior court’s child support 
order.  The court also held that because the order was obtained 
inadvertently through Westfall’s misrepresentations, it could be set 
aside under Rule 60(b).905  As a result, the supreme court vacated 
the child support order and remanded for recalculation of the child 
support due.906   
In Keturi v. Keturi,907 the supreme court affirmed in part 
and reversed in part several determinations regarding child 
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support, marital property, and income in divorce proceedings.908  
Troy Keturi appealed several factual findings made by the trial 
court during his divorce proceedings, namely the court’s decisions: 
(1) to average four years of his income for child support purposes, 
(2) that Troy’s arthritic illness would not affect his earning 
potential in the next three to four years, (3) that various properties 
were purchased with a loan or were a marital asset, and (4) the 
determination of his income in the year 1997.909  The court upheld 
the first three findings, but held that the determination of Keturi’s 
income in 1997 was clearly erroneous.910  The superior court’s 
determination of Troy’s income for 1997 was deemed clearly 
erroneous due to a lack of any evidence to support the court’s 
findings.911  As a result, the court remanded for recalculation of 
child support.912 
In Louise A. v. State,913 the supreme court held that the 
increased chance for adoption of a child in need of aid warrants the 
termination of parental rights even if no prospective adoptive 
parent has been identified.914  The superior court found Louise A.’s 
son to be a “child in need of aid” and that the child was still 
exposed to a substantial risk of harm.  It therefore terminated 
Louise A.’s parental rights.915  The court rejected Louise A.’s 
argument that termination is not in the best interests of her son 
because he would lose inheritance rights and because his chances 
for adoption were low.916  The supreme court upheld the 
termination because the court was not required to consider 
inheritance rights and because the benefits to the child of being 
available for adoption were sufficient to make termination of his 
mother’s parental rights in his best interest.917         
 In Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch,918 the supreme court held 
that in a custody proceeding where one parent is contemplating 
relocation, a complete analysis of the child’s best interests must 
consider the effect on the child of separation from both the moving 
and the non-moving parents.919  A mother appealed a custody order 
that granted primary physical custody to the father on the 
assumption that she would move out of Alaska.920  The mother 
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contended that the superior court placed too much emphasis on the 
geographic stability factor in awarding custody to the father.921  
The supreme court held that the superior court erred by analyzing 
the geographic stability factor narrowly and that the superior court 
should have evaluated the harm to the child if he were separated 
from his mother upon her relocation.922 
In Morgan B. v. State,923 the supreme court held that 
termination of parental rights does not require the court to specify 
whether the sexual abuse that places a child “in need of aid” is the 
result of abuse by the parent or whether the parent allowed the 
abuse to occur.924  After Morgan’s child was found to be in need of 
aid, his parental rights were terminated because the court found 
that the child was still exposed to a substantial risk of harm.925  
Morgan argued that his daughter was not a child in need of aid and 
that the findings were deficient because the court did not specify 
whether he personally was at fault for the abuse or whether he 
negligently allowed others to abuse the child.926   The supreme 
court held that the statute did not turn on whether the abuse was by 
the parent or by conditions created by the parent and under the 
statute there was no need to “pinpoint” the abusers.927  The court 
therefore upheld the termination of Morgan B.’s parental rights 
based on a clear finding of sexual abuse.928         
In Murphy v. Murphy,929 the supreme court held that a 
mother was owed child support reimbursement for prepaid 
payments when she was awarded interim custody of the children 
after obtaining a domestic violence protective order against the 
children’s custodian-father.930  The court held that the mother was 
entitled to child support for the interim custody only after she 
served her motion to modify.931  The court also affirmed that if 
there is an existing support agreement and a de facto shift in 
custody occurs, the rule prohibiting retroactive modification also 
prohibits modifying support payments owed before the date of the 
motion to modify.932 
In Nelson M. v. State,933 the supreme court held that the 
state actively attempted to prevent the breakup of an Indian family 
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and that parental rights should be terminated in the best interest of 
the child.934  The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services 
(DFYS) received numerous reports that Nelson and Dora neglected 
their child, Jason, who was often a witness to domestic violence 
between the two.935  A DFYS social worker organized a plan that 
provided alcohol treatment, parental training, anger management, 
and mental health counseling for the parents,936 but the state later 
filed for termination of Dora and Nelson’s parental rights.937  The 
supreme court affirmed the termination of parental rights because, 
despite DFYS’s efforts, neither parent participated in the 
counseling and treatment programs offered.938 Furthermore, 
Jason’s health had improved in foster care.939 The court held that it 
was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that 
terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of 
the child.940 
In Nunley v. State,941 the supreme court upheld a revenue 
examiner’s determination that Nunley was voluntarily 
underemployed and affirmed child support payments in the amount 
of $209 a month.942  A revenue hearing examiner from the 
Department of Revenue found Nunley to be voluntarily 
underemployed and ordered child support payments based on his 
earning potential.943  Nunley appealed, claiming that he faces 
limited employment opportunities due to a criminal record and that 
he could not afford $209 a month.944  The supreme court affirmed 
the examiner’s decision and upheld the child support payments, 
finding that the decision was supported by substantial evidence and 
that the amount of income imputed to Nunley was reasonable.945  
The court also noted that Nunley had many marketable skills and 
the primary obstacle to his employment was his unwillingness to 
seek it.946   
 In Ruth S. v. State,947 the supreme court held that the state 
was not equitably estopped from petitioning for termination of 
parental rights because one of the goals was reunification.948  Ruth 
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S. and the Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) agreed 
to a case plan regarding Ruth’s two minor children.949  While the 
plan contained concurrent goals of reunification and adoption,950 
DFYS eventually informed Ruth that due to Ruth’s difficulties 
with alcoholism, frequent relapses, and the special needs of the 
children, the department’s goal was adoption.951  The court held 
that because DFYS never stated that it would refrain from pursuing 
termination of parental rights, and actually made its intention to 
terminate clear, it was not equitably estopped from petitioning to 
terminate parental rights.952 
In Schmitz v. Schmitz,953 the supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s decision to award shared custody when the child 
turned five, but reversed the trial court’s ruling that various 
accounts were the separate property of Michael, the father, and 
vacated a ruling that one of Michael’s businesses was his separate 
property.954  
The mother, Christina, appealed the award of future shared 
custody to the Michael, claiming that the order had no evidentiary 
basis and violated her due process rights.955  The court held that the 
trial court appropriately considered the factors specified by Alaska 
Statutes section 25.24.150(c),956 including the child’s lack of 
special needs, Michael’s desire to change his life to better provide 
for his son, and the child’s need to have contact with his father in 
the future.957  The court held that because all procedural 
requirements were met, Christina’s due process rights were not 
violated.958  The superior court, therefore, properly awarded shared 
custody after the child’s fifth birthday and the order was 
affirmed.959  
Christina also appealed the superior court’s designation of 
Michael’s businesses, bank accounts, stock accounts and IRA as 
separate, non-marital property.960 The court vacated the trial 
court’s holding that one business, Schmitz & Buck, was separate 
property, and remanded to allow Christina to present evidence 
under the active appreciation doctrine.961 The court held, however, 
that Christina failed to demonstrate the element of marital 
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contribution for the other business, the Nugget Men’s Store, and 
thus the separate property designation for that business was 
appropriate.962 The court found that because the stock accounts, 
bank accounts and IRA each increased in value during the marital 
period, the designation of these assets as separate property was 
inappropriate.963 The superior court’s holdings with respect to 
these assets were therefore reversed and remanded.964  
In Stanley B. v. State,965 the supreme court concluded that 
there was clear and convincing evidence that a father’s criminal 
conduct, incarceration, and substance abuse impaired his ability to 
parent his children, and thus his children were “children in need of 
aid.”966  The court therefore affirmed the lower court’s decision 
terminating the father’s parental rights to his two children.967  The 
court applied the “clearly erroneous standard” to its review of the 
factual findings underlying the termination of parental rights.968  
The supreme court noted that the children’s father has a significant 
addiction to illegal substances which has resulted in his 
incarceration for lengthy periods throughout his children’s 
minority, that there was no other parent to care for the children, 
and that the father had failed to provide for the children’s care 
during his incarceration.969  Under these circumstances, Alaska law 
allows a court to declare such children to be “children in need of 
aid.”970  The court also affirmed the lower court’s holding that the 
Department of Youth and Family Services had made reasonable 
efforts to provide family support services to the children’s 
family.971 
In State v. DeLeon,972 the supreme court held that the 
superior court has the authority to order a delinquent father to 
either apply for a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) in order to pay 
court-ordered child support or to demonstrate his ineligibility for 
the dividend.973  The superior court denied a motion by the state to 
order DeLeon to apply for a PFD on the grounds that it had no 
statutory or inherent authority to issue the order.974  The supreme 
court found that this authority existed both expressly under Alaska 
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Statutes section 22.10.020975 and inherently as part of the superior 
court’s equitable authority.976  The supreme court further held that 
the purpose behind the Alaska child support scheme was to ensure 
that parents met their child support obligations, and denying the 
superior court the power to grant the motion the state requested 
would have frustrated that purpose.977  The court reversed the order 
of the superior court and remanded the matter for consideration of 
whether the circumstances warranted issuing the requested 
order.978 
In Weber v. State,979 the supreme court affirmed child 
support payments, but reversed as to a hearing officer’s calculation 
of income and therefore remanded for further consideration.980  
The Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) modified 
Weber’s child support obligation from $158 to $452 per month.981  
A hearing officer based the obligation on an estimated annual 
income of $27,146.982  The supreme court held that CSED did not 
err in modifying Weber’s support obligation.983  First, Weber was 
not below the poverty line.984  Second, while the agency itself 
agreed not to initiate a modification, the current modification was 
initiated by Weber’s ex-wife.985  Third, Weber cannot challenge 
his current payment because he had paid support for his sons 
despite the fact that they lived with him in the past.986  Fourth, 
CSED has authority to order post-majority support.987  Finally, 
Weber was not denied due process; he says he was denied a copy 
of his file before the hearing but the record showed he did not 
request a copy until the hearing itself.988  However, the court held 
that CSED’s determination of income was not supported by 
substantial evidence.989  Therefore, the court upheld the superior 
court decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded to CSED for 
further proceedings.990     
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XII. PROPERTY LAW 
 
In Adams v. Adams,991 the supreme court held that a party 
commits constructive frauds by changing a lease term without 
informing the other party to the lease.992  Although it was a 
departure from prior negotiations, Don Adams, on behalf of Alaska 
Rubber, changed a right of first refusal to a purchase option in the 
final draft of a lease agreement, without providing notice to 
Michael Adams.993  The supreme court held that, while Don 
Adams may not have intended to deceive Michael Adams, it was 
obligated to inform him of the change.994  However, since Michael 
Adams had reasonable opportunity to read the lease before signing 
it, the lease was voidable, not void.995  If Adams knew of the 
misrepresentation he would have lost the power to void the lease 
by agreeing to extend it, and the court remanded the case to 
determine whether Adams had actual knowledge that the lease 
contained the option to buy.996 
In Alaska Action Center, Inc. v. Municipality of 
Anchorage,997 the supreme court affirmed a municipal clerk’s 
refusal to certify a petition that would have the effect of preserving 
much of the lower end of Girdwood valley as a park.998  
Anchorage owns several hundred acres of undeveloped land in 
Girdwood Valley.999   Citizens of Girdwood proposed an initiative 
that would amend Anchorage’s charter and designate 730 acres as 
a park.1000  The municipal clerk refused to certify the petition.1001  
The court upheld the authority of the municipal clerk to reject the 
initiative on subject-matter grounds.1002  The court held that the 
Girdwood initiative would make an improper appropriation,1003 
and that no section of the initiative could be certified.1004   
In Baskurk v.Beal,1005 the supreme court held that a bulk 
foreclosure sale of two adjoining parcels of property was 
voidable.1006  At a foreclosure sale, Baskurt purchased two parcels 
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of land for one dollar more than what Beal, the defaulting debtor, 
owed on the property.1007  The supreme court held that a 
foreclosure sale may be voidable when the price paid is “grossly 
inadequate when compared to the fair market value of the property 
on the date of the foreclosure sale” and when the trustee fails to 
take reasonable steps to protect the debtor’s interests in the 
property.1008  Here, the court found that the sale price, which was 
fifteen percent of the fair market value, was grossly inadequate.1009  
Further, the court found the trustee breached her fiduciary duties to 
Beal in selling both parcels in bulk because the sale of only one 
parcel would have satisfied Beal’s debt.1010 
In Chickaloon-Moose Creek Native Association, Inc. v. 
Norton,1011 the Ninth Circuit held that the Department of Interior’s 
decision to convey federal government lands to a regional 
corporation for reconveyance to Native villages was proper and 
that, pursuant to the terms of the Deficiency Agreement, those 
lands listed in Appendix A must be conveyed prior to those lands 
listed in Appendix C.1012  In 1976, the Deficiency Agreement was 
adopted as a compromise intended to ameliorate problems with an 
earlier agreement to distribute land from the public domain to 
Native villages after all aboriginal title to land in Alaska was 
extinguished in 1971.1013  The Deficiency Agreement was an 
attempt to resolve a dispute in which it was alleged that the 
Department of Interior distributed lands of much lower quality 
than those surrounding Native villages and rendered the latter 
ineligible for withdrawal.1014  The court held that the language of 
the Deficiency Agreement was clear and unambiguous and 
precluded the conveyance of certain lands until those lands listed 
in Appendix A of the agreement were exhausted.1015  The court 
also held that there was no mutual intent of the parties contrary to 
the language of the agreement.1016   
In Cline v. Cline,1017 the supreme court held that the 
superior court abused its discretion by awarding more than 50% of 
Cline’s pension to Lopez, his ex-wife, and remanded the case to 
calculate the correct amount owed.1018  In a 1992 divorce property 
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division, the trial judge awarded 18% of Cline’s pension to Lopez 
and set $500 as the monthly payment amount.1019  Ten years after 
settlement, Lopez sued for a revision.1020  The court awarded her 
past benefits and interest but lowered the payment amount.1021  
Cline argued that this revision should apply retroactively because 
the initial amount was too high.1022  The supreme court, basing its 
judgment on the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection 
Act, 1023 which limits apportionment of military retirement benefits 
to 50%, held that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
Lopez 62% of Cline’s pension.1024  The supreme court reversed the 
disposition of income and set the payment amount at 50% of 
retirement benefits.1025  The court also held that the imminent 
reduction of Mr. Cline’s retirement income because of disability 
payments was a proper matter for reconsideration under federal 
law.1026 
In Dykstra v. Municipality of Anchorage,1027 the supreme 
court held that Dykstra’s use of his property to accommodate his 
car collection of twenty or more cars violated the applicable zoning 
statute.1028  Dykstra claimed that the use of his property to collect 
cars was permissible as an accessory use, or, in the alternative, that 
the zoning provisions were unconstitutionally vague.1029  Noting 
that the issue was one of first impression in Alaska, the court relied 
on precedent from other jurisdictions to determine that an 
accessory use of property becomes impermissible when the 
property owner’s use involves unreasonable or uncommon 
extremes.1030 The court also held that the adopted approach to 
accessory use was flexible without being impermissibly vague, and 
therefore, was not unconstitutional.1031  The court remanded the 
case for further findings based on the zoning board’s failure to 
adopt specific findings and to give Dykstra reasonable notice of the 
steps necessary to remedy his violation.1032  
The supreme court also held that, in drafting and passing 
ARCA, the legislature did not create the railroad under the 
presumption that it would be immune from local zoning 
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ordinances.1033 The supreme court concluded that a balancing-of-
interests test was the appropriate tool to discern legislative intent 
when a law and its legislative history provided no clear indication 
of intent.1034 Under this test, the governmental entity seeking 
immunity has the burden to prove that the balance of certain 
factors favors immunity.1035 However, the supreme court further 
held that it was not appropriate for courts to apply this test unless 
the state had first made “a reasonable good faith attempt to comply 
with local zoning laws.”1036 Finally, the supreme court held that the 
railroad must apply for the conditional use permit and fail in that 
application before further proceedings on the issue of immunity 
could be heard.1037 
In Fyffe v. Wright,1038 the supreme court held that a 
landlord who disposes of a tenant’s personal property without 
notice is entitled to present evidence to offset the damages award 
to the tenant in a later suit.1039  Fyffe moved out of the home she 
rented from Wright, but left some of her belongings in a shed on 
the property.1040  When she returned to claim the items, she learned 
that Wright had given them to charity.1041  The superior court 
awarded damages to Fyffe, but offset the award by the amount she 
owed Wright for past rent and damage to the rental property.1042  
The supreme court affirmed to prevent injustice to Wright.1043 
In Glover v. Glover,1044 the supreme court held that a 
former tenant asserting adverse possession must give clear and 
distinct notice that his claim is hostile to the true owner of the 
property.1045  Clara Glover sued to quiet title in a contested lot that 
had changed hands several times in the previous forty years.1046  
The superior court found that the former tenant acquired the lot 
through adverse possession—though initial occupancy was 
permissive, the lot was eventually sold and the tenant’s possession 
became hostile.1047  The supreme court held that neither transfer of 
property nor non-payment of rent automatically changes 
permissive occupancy to hostile possession, and remanded to 
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determine whether the former tenant’s claim was based on a 
distinct and positive assertion of ownership.1048 
In Native Village of Eklutna v Alaska Railroad  Corp.,1049 
the supreme court held that the Alaska Railroad Corporation Act 
(“ARCA”)1050 did not grant the Alaska Railroad Corporation 
immunity from local zoning laws.1051 The Native Village of 
Eklutna sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the railroad 
from carrying out blasting operations in a quarry owned by the 
railroad on land adjacent to the village.1052 Eklutna argued that the 
railroad had not obtained the conditional use permit required to 
operate the quarry under a local zoning ordinance.1053 The railroad 
maintained that it was not subject to the ordinance because ARCA 
and its legislative history showed that the legislature intended for 
the railroad to be immune from local zoning laws.1054 The superior 
court’s decision had found that the railroad possessed such 
immunity.1055  In reversing, the supreme court held that ARCA and 
its legislative history provided no clear indication of the 
legislature’s intent regarding the authority of local zoning laws 
over the railroad.1056  
In Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co.,1057 the supreme 
court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants and 
remanded for determination as to whether a landlord’s refusal to 
consent to a tenant’s sublease was unreasonable.1058  Norville 
refused to permit Safeway (who had bought out Carr-Gottstein 
Foods Co.) to sublease a portion of their supermarket to a bank 
without awarding him 75% of the sublease rent.1059  Safeway 
accepted Norville’s terms but initiated legal proceedings that 
Norville’s conditions were unreasonable and in violation of their 
original lease.1060  The court rejected Safeway’s first argument that 
Norville could not object to the sublease because the use of said 
space would be permitted to the tenant under the lease.1061  Instead, 
the court found that a refusal of a sublease is permitted if such 
refusal is commercially reasonable.1062  The court reversed and 
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remanded the case to determine whether Norville’s reasons were 
genuine and reasonable under the circumstances at hand.1063   
In Rush v. Department of Natural Resources,1064 the 
supreme court affirmed the Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) decision that, under Alaska Statute section 38.05.090, the 
auction purchaser of formerly leased land must pay the lessee the 
value of the buildings and fixtures the lessee owned on the 
property.1065  A non-profit organization attempted to buy the land it 
leased and on which it managed a hatchery.1066  DNR decided to 
sell the land at auction.1067  If the non-profit was not the auction 
winner, the buyer was required to purchase the non-profit’s 
buildings.1068  Rush, a neighbor, challenged this ruling, arguing 
that amendments to Section  38.05.090 no longer required this 
purchase.1069  The supreme court found that the amended version 
of the statute was not intended to be applied retroactively and 
could not be applied if it had a retroactive effect.1070  The court 
held that applying the amended version rather than the statute as it 
stood at the time the lease commenced would have an 
impermissible retroactive effect because it substantively altered the 
disposition of proceeds from the property’s sale.1071  The court 
held that the former version of the statute should be applied.1072   
In Soules v. Ramstack,1073 the supreme court held the Estate 
of Pauline King responsible for a special assessment fee for the 
condominium that the estate sold to Ramstack.1074  The condo 
association informed all homeowners, including King’s estate, that 
a special assessment fee had been levied and also advised 
homeowners attempting to sell their units to deposit the fee upon 
closing.1075  Soules, representing King’s estate, argued that 
Ramstack should pay the fee because the estate sold the condo 
before the fee was due, and Ramstack would be unjustly enriched 
if the estate paid the fee.1076  The court held that debts can exist 
before they are due and the fee was an existing obligation at the 
time of the condo’s sale.1077  The court rejected Soules’ unjust 
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enrichment claim because Ramstack paid fair value for the condo 
and the estate would be required merely to fulfill a prior 
contractual obligation.1078  
In Zok v. Estate of Collins,1079 the supreme court held that a 
fraudulent conveyance claim should have been further investigated 
before the court ordered an estate closed.1080  Zok sued his 
attorney, Collins, for malpractice.1081  Before Zok could file suit, 
however, Collins transferred parcels of real property to the Collins 
Family Trust.1082  After Collins died a year later, probate 
proceedings were opened by his personal representative.1083  Zok 
filed a written objection to the closing of the estate without 
consideration of his claim.1084  However, the probate court did not 
address this claim or provide Zok with a hearing on this issue.1085  
On appeal, Zok argued that he was not given notice that his 
fraudulent conveyance claims would be tried at the probate hearing 
and that it was error to close the estate before the claims were 
resolved.1086  The court held that Zok was not given proper 
notice.1087 Furthermore, the court held that Zok’s fraudulent 
conveyance claim should have been adjudicated before the estate 
was closed.1088 
XIII. TORT LAW 
 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Teel,1089 the supreme court held 
that the phrase “insured person” in an insurance policy provision 
covered an individual claiming negligent infliction of emotional 
distress from the death of an occupant in an insured automobile.1090  
Teel’s son died from injuries resulting from a drunk driving 
accident.1091  After collecting $50,000, the limit under the drunk 
driver’s policy, Teel was denied a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress under the her own policy’s 
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists (UM/UIM) provisions.1092  Teel 
sued her insurance agency, Allstate, arguing that she was legally 
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entitled to recover under the UM/UIM provisions of her policy and 
that Allstate employees had fraudulently persuaded her to accept 
the limits of her own policy’s UM/UIM provisions at 
arbitration.1093 Allstate claimed that Teel was not an “insured 
person” under the UM/UIM provisions because her injuries were 
not derivative and that the coverage under the policy had already 
been exhausted.1094  The supreme court held that Teel was an 
“insured person” under the policy, upholding the superior court’s 
ruling that the UM/UIM provisions cover not only derivative 
injuries, but also injuries that are legally caused by and are the 
foreseeable result of injury to the insured or a close relative of the 
insured.1095   
In Bryson v. Banner Health System,1096 the supreme court 
held that the Family Recovery Center owed a patient a limited but 
actionable duty of care to protect her from foreseeable harm in the 
course of her treatment.1097  Bryson was attacked by a fellow 
patient at the Center, a substance abuse outpatient treatment 
facility.1098  After the attack, Bryson filed suit against the Center 
alleging negligence on the part of the facility for failure to warn 
and protect her from the other patient, whom the Center knew to be 
dangerous.1099  The Center asserted that federal regulations 
precluded it from divulging the confidential treatment records or 
criminal history of patients, and thus, that it had no duty to warn its 
patients.1100  Considering the parties’ motions for summary 
judgment, the superior court held that the Center could have taken 
actions to warn or protect Bryson during her treatment without 
violating its statutory duty of confidentiality, and thus there 
remained a triable issue of fact regarding the relation-specific 
duty.1101  On interlocutory review, Bryson argued that the duty of 
the Center should not be limited to the patient-treatment context, 
and the Center argued that the lower court erred in finding an 
actionable duty.1102  The supreme court held that when the Center 
undertook to treat Bryson it formed a “special relationship” that 
gave rise to a reasonable duty of care.1103  The supreme court 
further agreed with the superior court that the Center could have 
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taken steps to warn or protect Bryson notwithstanding a statutory 
duty of confidentiality.1104 
In City of Bethel v. Peters,1105 the supreme court held that 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 407 does not preclude admission of a 
redacted post-accident report.1106  Peters fell in a city-owned senior 
center and brought a successful suit for negligence against the 
city.1107  At trial, a report prepared by the city’s director of senior 
services following the accident was entered into evidence.1108  This 
report noted that following Peters’s accident, safety bars were 
installed in the shower area to prevent falls.1109  However, the 
portion of the report detailing what corrective actions were taken 
was redacted.1110  The supreme court held that while Rule 407 bars 
the admission of evidence showing remedial corrective measures, 
the redacted report was not excludable on these grounds.1111   
In Ledgends, Inc. v. Kerr,1112 the supreme court, in a per 
curiam decision, affirmed the superior court’s decision rejecting 
Ledgends’s affirmative defense based upon a release signed by 
Kerr.1113  Kerr sued a health club after injuring her knee as a result 
of a fall from a climbing wall, alleging negligence by the club for 
failing to keep the premises in a “reasonably safe condition.”1114  
The key issue at trial involved a release signed by Kerr prior to 
climbing the wall.1115  The superior court found the release 
ambiguous as to its scope, and, employing a narrow reading, 
declined to interpret it as a release from all negligence by the 
club.1116  The supreme court issued a brief per curium opinion 
which expressly adopted the reasoning of the superior court and 
affirmed its decision.1117 
In Parker v. Tomera,1118 the supreme court held that a 
plaintiff is required to support a medical malpractice claim with 
expert testimony1119 and that a court is not required to appoint an 
expert advisory panel in all medical malpractice cases.1120  Parker 
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visited a urologist, Tomera, to have his urinary problems 
evaluated.1121  Tomera and his staff performed a procedure known 
as a Parson’s Test in an attempt to diagnose Parker’s ailment.1122  
Parker brought suit against Tomera alleging that he experienced 
sexual dysfunction as a result of this procedure.1123  The statute1124 
that governs medical malpractice claims places the burden of proof 
on the plaintiff.1125  Because his injury was technical in nature, the 
supreme court held that Parker was required to support his claim 
with expert testimony.1126  Parker’s failure to provide an expert 
made summary judgment on his medical malpractice claim 
appropriate.1127  Further, the supreme court held that the superior 
court’s decision not to appoint an expert advisory panel was not in 
error because the specific circumstances of the case made it 
impossible to find three neutral panel members.1128   
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